REGIME TYPE: DOES IT REALLY MATTER?
On the Perils of Semi-Presidentialism for
Party System Institutionalization in
Post-communist Eastern Europe

Abstract

Among political scientists the debate about the relative virtues/vices of the
different regime types has constituted one of the most incandescent fields of inquiry.
Yet few studies address the impact of semi-presidentialism on the prospects for party
system institutionalization, otherwise a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the
consolidation of democracy (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Morlino, 1998). Seeking to
begin to fill this gap in the literature, and departing from a new operationalization of the
party system institutionalization (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, 2010), this paper constitutes
an attempt to analyse the effects parliamentarism and/or semi-presidentialism produce
on the level of systemic institutionalization in new 17 post-communist Eastern
European democracies. Examining differences in these cases, to which an in-depth
analysis of four representative case-studies is added, the paper finds substantial
evidence that, in clear contrast to parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism is detrimental
to the process of institutionalization in young party systems.

Keywords: party system institutionalization; type of regime; post-communist Eastern
Europe; electoral fragmentation; party institutionalization
Introduction

Among political scientists the debate about the relative virtues/VICES of the different regime types has constituted one of the most incandescent fields of inquiry. Intellectually, such debate was launched almost two decades ago by the conviction that institutions matter as they are considered to have an autonomous impact on the development of party politics. In this context, Linz’s seminal articles on The Perils of Presidentialism and The Virtues of Parliamentarism, published in 1990, constituted the milestone sparking much of the subsequent discussion. Since then many scholars across the world have put their efforts into investigating the relationship between type of regime and democratic consolidation in new post-authoritarian states. In terms of regime-related outcomes, however, and in comparison to the work on presidentialism and parliamentarism, there has been “far less research on the institutional […] outcomes of premier-presidential [meaning semi-presidential] regimes” (Roper, 2002:263; see also Elgie, 2004). Moreover, even if party system institutionalization is considered to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the good functioning of democracy (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Morlino, 1998; Stockton, 2001), little has been said about the effect the type of regime may have on the process of party system institutionalization in new democracies.

Seeking to begin to fill this gap in the literature, this paper attempts to analyse the effect of the type of regime on the process of party system institutionalization in new post-communist democracies. In this context, the paper proceeds as follows. Section one offers an analytical perspective on the conceptualization of semi-presidentialism and party system institutionalization. Some of the scholarly debate of the concept is briefly addressed, showing how certain aspects of these two notions have led to certain confusion and misunderstanding within the literature. The ambition is to clear out some of those difficulties, and provide concise definitions which enable us to analyze the relationship between the abovementioned phenomena in new democracies. Section two summarizes some of the most important arguments advanced by scholars in the course of the regime type debate, making several new propositions concerning the possible implications the type of regime may have for the institutionalization of party systems while testing their validity on the basis of the empirical evidence from 17 post-Eastern European democracies. Finally, section three analyses the causal mechanisms linking type of regime and party system institutionalization in four representative countries.
Semi-presidentialism and Party System Institutionalization: Two Debated Concepts

As it follows from the substantial body of recent literature devoted to the concept (Bahro et al., 1998; Elgie, 1998, 1999; Pasquino, 1997; Roper, 2002; Sartori, 1997; Siaroff, 2003), the notion of semi-presidentialism has been particularly prone to definitional problems. Different scholars have adopted or launched quite different definitions of the concept (O’Neill, 1993; Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 2001; Sartori, 1997; Linz, 1994) and, as a consequence, the identification of the set of semi-presidential countries has varied from writer to writer (Elgie, 1998, 1999; Sartori, 1997:122).

In the current paper, I will rely on Elgie’s purely constitutional definition of the concept, by now the most common way of defining this type of regime (e.g. Elgie 2005; Elgie and McMeniman, 2008; Elgie and Moestrup, 2007, 2008; Kirschke, 2007; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2006; Protsyk, 2005a; Skach 2005; Shugart 2005; 2006). Thus, semi-presidentialism is considered to be “a regime where there is both a popularly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and a cabinet responsible to the legislature” (1999:13).

In contrast to others’ (Duverger, 1980; Pasquino, 1997; Sartori, 1997), this is a purely constitutional definition which has the advantage of being (1) minimal, as it focuses solely on the mode of election and removal of the two heads of the executive; (2) precise because, omitting any reference to the powers of the president, it minimises the opportunity for variation in case selection from one writer to the next; and (3) parsimonious because simply relying on what is considered to be the same basic constitutional structure, it allows for a more accurate differentiation between semi-presidentialism and all versions of parliamentarism and presidentialism (Elgie and Moestrup, 2007).¹

Similarly, and although it may be difficult to believe given its central importance, the concept of party system institutionalization has no established definition. Putting it very briefly, and summarizing a discussion sketched out in an earlier paper (Casal Bértola, forthcoming), most authors dealing with the concept simple

¹ This is not to say, however, that it does not pose any problems, as Elgie himself has recognised (2008:51). In fact, one of the most important borderline cases is Slovakia, where the president can be removed from office by a plebiscite. However, as Elgie (2005) has argued, the removal of a president by plebiscite cannot be equated to the removal of the head of state by a vote of confidence in the assembly. In this sense, the Slovak president should be considered to occupy a fixed-term presidency.
propose a series of “dimensions” of the notion (Morlino, 1998; Bielasiak, 2002; Grzymała-Busse, 2002; Meleshevič, 2007), without paying much attention to the conceptualization itself.

Notwithstanding the latter, and despite the fact that no two scholars have arrived at the same final combination of dimensions of institutionalization, the truth is that all meanings of the conception of party system institutionalization contain the idea of stability and persistence in the rules and nature of inter-party competition (Lindberg, 2007; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mair, 2001; Przeworski, 1975). As a consequence, and bearing in mind that the core of a party system is to be found in the patterns of interaction among its subunits (i.e. political parties; see Sartori, 1976; Mair, 2006), I consider party system institutionalization to be the process by which the patterns of interaction among political parties become routine, predictable and stable over time (Bakke and Sitter, 2005; Mair, 2001). In other words, a system of parties can be said to be institutionalized when political parties cooperate, collaborate and colligate in a standardized and structured way - a way that is independent of the relevant issues in each moment and which random shocks cannot alter (Mainwaring, 1998).

In order to assess the level of institutionalization in new East Central European party systems, I will rely on Mair’s (1996, 2007) framework for party system analysis which, focusing on the patterns of inter-party competition for government, enables to determine whether a party system is or not institutionalized (table 1). Putting it briefly, party systems are considered to be institutionalized if (1) alternations of governments are either total or none, (2) governing alternatives are stable over a long period of time, and (3) some parties (“outsiders”) are permanently excluded from participation in national government and weakly institutionalized when there are (1) partial alternations of governments, (2) no stable compositions of governing alternatives and (3) access to government has been granted to all relevant parties.

In order to minimize subjective judgements and opinions in the measurement of the elements of party system institutionalization, I quantitatively operationalize each of the factors suggested by Mair (Table 1). First of all, the degree of governmental alternation is measured by a so-called index of government alternation (IGA – see Mair

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2 “Interaction” refers to the creation and dissolution of coalitions and alliances, or changing between behaviours of cooperation and competition.

3 It should be borne in mind that, notwithstanding these two limiting cases, the degree of closure varies, ranging along a continuum from situations where it is more pronounced to those in which it is less, thereupon reflecting different degrees of institutionalization.
2007:140), which simply adapts Pedersen’s (1979) well-known index of electoral volatility to the measurement of ministerial volatility.\(^4\) The second criterion, based on assessing whether or not the party or combination of parties has governed before in that particular format, is captured by an index of familiar alternation (IFA), which measures the percentage of ministries belonging to familiar combinations of parties.\(^5\) Thirdly, access to government is measured by the index of entry closure (IEC), which basically calculates the percentage of ministers belonging to “old” governing parties.

Table 1. Criteria and Operational Indicators of Party System Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
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</table>
|             | Government Alternation          | IGA: Pedersen’s index of ministerial volatility (MV) | . If MV≥50, then IGA = MV 
. If MV<50, then IGA = 100-MV                                                        |
|             | Governing Formulae              | IFA: % ministers of all familiar governments     | . If the very same combination = 100% 
. If entirely new combination or new party forms single party government = 0% 
. If part of the new government is familiar = % of the familiar part 
. If a party earlier in government forms a government on its own = 100 - % of previous coalition partners |
|             | Access to government            | IEC: % ministers from “old” governing parties    | “Old” governing parties (see Sikk, 2005)                                             |

Source: Adapted from Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2010:19)

Because time is particularly important when trying to measure the level of party system institutionalization in a country (Mair, 1997), I also take into consideration all the years a particular cabinet has lasted, understanding that if there have been two or more cabinets in one year, then the averages of the scores for the different above-cited government features are considered to characterized the year better than any of such individual factors (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, 2010:20). Finally, and in order to avoid measuring incompatible scores, I use the standardized (z-) score of the three variables. The addition of all those three z-scores gives the final degree of system institutionalization in what I have named “composite index of party system institutionalization” (iPSI) which, giving weight to all the elements of stability, has the advantage of paying due attention to it as the sole dimension of institutionalization.

An overview of the level of party system institutionalization in new post-communist party systems is shown in Figure 1, which ranks the 17 Eastern European

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\(^4\) Ministerial volatility is computed by adding the net change in percentage of “ministers” (including the prime minister), rather than ministries or portfolios, gained and lost by each party in the cabinet from one government to the next, and then dividing by two.

\(^5\) For detailed instructions on how to consider a combination of parties familiar, please see Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2010).
democracies\(^6\) in terms of the stability in the structure of inter-party competition for government during the period 1990-2009. Apart from the pronounced cross-national variation shown by these summary data, the most evident conclusion to be drawn is that while the four party systems at the top of the ranking (i.e. Kosovo, Hungary, Albania and the Czech Republic) are all instances of parliamentarism, the three least institutionalized party systems (i.e. Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania) are semi-presidential.

Figure 1. Party system institutionalization in 17 post-communist Eastern European countries\(^7\)

It is also interesting to note that it is only among semi-presidential regimes that a prevailing tendency towards a lack of systemic institutionalization can be found. Indeed, it is by simply looking at the weakly institutionalized party systems (iPSI ≤ 0) that we can find only two parliamentary regimes (i.e. Latvia and Estonia), while the other six (i.e. Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine) are all instances of semi-presidentialism. Slovakia, after the adoption of semi-presidentialism, is just on the verge (iPSI = 0.1). On the other hand, while none of the parliamentary systems can be considered to be under-institutionalized (iPSI ≤ -1), only two (i.e. Croatia and Slovenia) out of eleven semi-presidential regimes is considered to be institutionalized (≥ 1).

\(^{6}\) All of the countries included in the current study are considered to be “minimally” democratic, as they score 6 or higher on the polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset (Polity IV Project 2009). Montenegro has been excluded due to the lack of enough analytical time (at least one year) since the “founding” elections.

\(^{7}\) Moldova and Slovakia are divided into two different periods according to the distinct type of regime adopted.
All in all, the truth is that while party systems in post-communist Eastern Europe have institutionalized in different ways and at different rates (Casal Bétoa and Mair, forthcoming), it follows from the data above that parliamentary systems tend to be more institutionalized than semi-presidential ones. It is to explain this relationship between systemic institutionalization and type of regime that I will devote the rest of this paper.

**On the Perils of Semi-presidentialism for Party System Institutionalization**

Although since Linz’s (1990a/b) seminal work a great deal of research has been devoted to analyse the effects of constitutional regime choice on the consolidation and functioning of democracy (in general), the truth is that the vast majority of work has focused both on presidentialism and parliamentarism and, only to a slightly lesser extent, on semi-presidentialism. Yet, to the extent that scholars have theorized about it, they have arrived to a rather straightforward conclusion, namely: semi-presidentialism should definitively be avoided (Colton and Skach, 2005; Lijphart, 2004; Linz, 1994; Stepan and Skach, 1993; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Suleiman and Stepan, 1995; Moestrup, 2004; Valenzuela, 2004), especially in young democracies.⁸

In particular, semi-presidentialism has three major problems, namely: the fixed term of the head of state makes semi-presidential regimes prone to cohabitation; the president and the cabinet have competing claims to legitimacy; semi-presidential regimes are more prone to experience divided minority government (Elgie, 2007, 2008). The bottom-line argument is then that semi-presidential regimes are less likely to be conducive to stable democracy than parliamentary systems. In this context, Stepan and Suleiman speak for a long line of scholars when they note that semi-presidentialism “is a more risk-prone system than the modern parliamentarism that has evolved in Europe […]” (1995:412).

It should be borne in mind, however, that all these criticisms of semi-presidentialism developed in the context of democratic transition in post-authoritarian states and were used to explain democratic survival and/or collapse. Still, to the extent that they can be extrapolated to the analysis of party system institutionalization in new democracies, they seem to suggest that the higher the power of the president, the lower the level of systemic institutionalization will be (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Sartori, 1997; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Skach, 2005, etc.).

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⁸ This is not equivalent to say, however, that semi-presidentialism does not have any friends (e.g. Duverger, 1997; Fish, 2001a; Frison-Roche, 2005; Pasquino, 1997; Sartori, 1997), although they are obviously fewer than in the case of parliamentarism.
In order to test the previous assumption, figure 2 plots the level of party system institutionalization in a country with the degree of power post-communist heads of state have at their disposal (see Spörer, 2004). Although the correlation between the previous variables is not only significant (at 0.01 level), but also relevant \( r = -0.698 \), one important observation can be drawn from an in-depth look at the particular cases: once the two countries with least institutionalized party systems and the most powerful presidents (i.e. Ukraine and Poland up to 1996) are excluded, the relationship between the two variables here analyzed becomes insignificant as well as irrelevant \( r = -0.277 \).

In fact, a quick examination of the cases reveals similar levels of party system institutionalization in countries where the degree presidential power totally differs (e.g. Czech Republic and Croatia, Latvia and Bulgaria, or Estonia and Lithuania). On the contrary, in countries where the power of the president remained unchanged despite the transformation of regime type, the level of systemic institutionalization clearly

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9 When both Ukraine and Poland (either up or from 1996) are excluded the correlation score is as low as -0.055.
fluctuates (e.g. Slovakia). This is not to say, however, that as some scholars have suggested (see Elgie and Moestrup, 2008) the powers of the president are irrelevant when trying to explain party system development and institutionalization in semi-presidential regimes. In fact, in this case the correlation is both significant and relevant \( (r = -0.788, \text{ sig at 0.01 level}) \), even when the two abovementioned most extreme cases are excluded \( (r = -0.567, \text{ sig. at 0.05 level}; R^2 = .32) \). However, this is not the aim of this paper which, as stated at the beginning, focuses on the effects different types of regime – parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism, in concrete - may have on the process of party system institutionalization in new post-communist Eastern European democracies.

Still, what really follows from the above analysis is that, contrary to the large amount of literature focusing on the powers of the president to explain democratic consolidation in post-transitional countries, the former cannot be employed to explain why new post-communist party systems diverge in their level of institutionalization. In this context, and because of those power-centred approaches scholars have failed to anticipate, generally speaking, the explosive repercussions the popular election of the president can pose for the process of party system institutionalization itself.\(^{11}\)

10 Still, the correlation between party system institutionalization and presidential power in parliamentary regimes is not only both insignificant and irrelevant \( (r = 0.043) \), but also in the “wrong” direction.

11 The only exception is Bartolini’s (1984) work on the direct election of the head of state in Western Europe, even if he does not directly deal with systemic institutionalization. In this context, even Meleshevich’s (2007) recent study on the relationship between type of government and political institutionalization in Post-soviet countries suffer from the abovementioned power-centric conceptualization.
According to my understanding and as it follows from figure 3, the perils of semi-presidentialism for the institutionalization of a country’s party system can be of two different types: indirect and direct.\textsuperscript{12}

**Indirect effects: Fragmentation and...**

Presidential elections are commonly thought to influence the size of the legislative party system through a coattails effect (Golder, 2006),\textsuperscript{13} although it is not very clearly in the literature if such influence will have a increasing (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova, 1999; Jones, 1995; Linz, 1994), or a reductive character (Cox 1997; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003; Rose and Tikhomirov, 1996; Shugart and Carey, 1992).\textsuperscript{14} Although all these claims seem to be contradictory, the answer to this dilemma is to be found – as usual in political science - somehow in the middle, namely, it will depend on the specific institutional arrangements a country has adopted.

In general, scholars agree that when determining the electoral effects of semi-presidentialism on the number of parties all of the mechanical and psychological effects of single-member district elections (Cox, 1997; Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1997) apply. At the end of the day, and because presidential elections have a winner-take-all character (i.e., district magnitude is 1), presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes should be considered to have a reductive effect.\textsuperscript{15} However, and according to the literature on the consequences of electoral systems, such reductive effect will be different depending on the electoral rule employed. Thus, if the electoral rule is plurality, the popular election of the head of state will have a reductive effect as, on the one hand, political elites will tend to form broader coalitions of like-minded parties, and voters may opt for strategic voting out of fear of wasting their votes (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997:36). In Moser’s own words:

\textsuperscript{12} it is important to note here that, rather than law-like generalizations that inexorably links semi-presidentialism with party system under-institutionalization, each and every of the propositions presented in this section need to be seen as tendencies and arrangements that “can”, but may not, hinder institutionalization. In other words, it is a question of potentiality, as each of the regime-related effects on the process of systemic institutionalization proposed below will depend on both institutional arrangements (i.e. timing, sequence and electoral system) and, obviously, personal agency (i.e. coalition bargaining).

\textsuperscript{13} Although the major part of the research on the effects of presidential elections on the “effective” number of parties derives from the “presidentialist” literature (e.g. Jones, 1995; Mainwaring, 1993; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Shugart and Carey, 1992), I consider it to be also relevant for the purposes of this analysis, as in semi-presidential regimes the head of state is also popularly elected.

\textsuperscript{14} To complicate the debate, some scholars state that the popular presidential elections may have no effect at all (e.g. Samuels 2000).

\textsuperscript{15} In fact, in the majority of new European democratic countries the “effective” number of presidential parties has often been lower than both the actual and effective number of electoral parties.
The fear of splitting the vote within a specific ideological camp’s potential electorate and allowing victory to a candidate from the opposite end of the political spectrum further reinforces impulses for consolidation [meaning concentration] (2001:98)

On the contrary, if the electoral formula is majoritarian (i.e. two-round), presidential elections will have the opposite effect. The main reasons for that are three, namely: (1) because presidential elections are the unrivalled event in the political calendar of any country,\(^\text{16}\) competition for the presidency enhances the public visibility of politicians through increased media exposure and campaign contributions, boosting their options in future parliamentary elections (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova, 1999; Müller, 1999:42-43; Gallagher, 1999:113); (2) “the expectation of a runoff increases the incentive to compete in the first run, either in the hope of placing among the two most favoured or of gaining bargaining power for support in the runoff of one of the two leading contenders” (Linz, 1994:22; see also Golder, 2006:42, or Wright and Riker, 1989);\(^\text{17}\) (3) last but not least, because presidents – even if not powerful - are usually seen as the leader of the nation by the majority of the population, the weight of the presidency encourages the formation of parties by ruthless politicians in order to simply satisfy their “personal” ambitions (e.g. Paksas in Lithuania, Eanes in Portugal, Snegur in Moldova, etc.).

Likewise, the extent to which presidential elections will have a reductive effect on the number of parties will also depend on the electoral cycle, concretely, on the temporal proximity of presidential and legislative elections. Thus, and due to the “spillover” effect that the presidency has on the behaviour of voters and party elites in legislative elections (Mainwaring, 1993), if both types of elections are held concurrently, presidential elections will have a reductive effect on the effective number of electoral parties. Conversely, if the two elections do not coincide, such reductive effect will be definitively weaker (Jones, 1995; Lijphart, 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Amorin Neto and Cox, 1997; Sedelius, 2006; Shugart and Carey, 1992).\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{16}\)The fact that the electoral turnout in presidential elections has been, generally speaking, significantly higher than in parliamentary elections seems to confirm, beyond all doubt, this assumption.
\(^{17}\) In fact, as Golder (2006:47) has maintained, the adoption of run-off provisions will only “exacerbate any legislative fragmentation caused by the use of proportional representation in legislative elections”.
\(^{18}\) For an opposite argument see Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (1999), although they themselves recognize the (statistical and temporal) limitations of their analysis.
All in all, and taking into consideration all what has been said, I may conclude stating that popular elected presidents will increase multi-partism in those systems where presidential elections does not have a concurrent/plurality character.

Figure 4. Type of regime and the “effective” number of electoral parties in post-communist Eastern Europe (1990-2009)

![Chart showing the effective number of electoral parties in post-communist Eastern Europe from 1990 to 2009.](chart.png)

Figure 4 ranks all post-communist party systems according to the “effective” number of electoral parties (ENEP), calculated according to Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) classic index. As is evident from the figure, Ukraine reflects by far the most pronounced levels of electoral fragmentation, followed some way back by Estonia (in 1992) and Slovakia (from 2002). At the other side of the ranking (i.e. among the most electorally concentrated party systems), Moldova (from 2001) and Albania (both parliamentary regimes), are found. Moreover, and with the only exception of Latvia, among the most electorally fragmented party systems (ENEP ≥ 6) can be found, namely: Poland, Lithuania and Slovenia, on top of the above-cited Slovakia (2002-2009), Estonia (1992) and Ukraine.

Interestingly enough, when both variables are statistically correlated, the resultant coefficient (-0.260), although in the expected direction, seems to deny any relevant relationship between them. Still, if a plot (not included) of both variables is

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19 Although Estonia is generally considered to be a parliamentary regime, the first Estonian presidential elections had a direct character and, therefore, need to be considered among the semi-presidential ones, at least in terms of the ENEP. The reason for that is that the first democratic elections (both presidential and parliamentary) since the restoration of democracy in Estonia were concurrently held on September the 20th, 1992.

20 Type of regime (ToR) is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, that is: parliamentarism (1) and semi-presidentialism (0).
undertaken, it is possible to distinguish two rather clear outliers, one among each of the parliamentary and semi-presidential countries, namely: Latvia and Ukraine, respectively. When those two systems are excluded, the correlation coefficient increases up to -.327, revealing a certain negative relationship between electoral fragmentation and type of regime worthy of study. All in all, and as it follows from table A in the Appendix, the truth is that post-communist Eastern European semi-presidential regimes, with an average ENEP of 6.7, tend to be more electorally fragmented than parliamentary systems (ENEP = 5.2).

... Party Institutionalization

In general, it has been argued that semi-presidentialism has acted as a major impediment to the development of institutionalized political parties (Colton, 1995; Fish, 2001b; Huskey, 1997). Scholars have cited several reasons as to why this has been so.

First, contrary to parliamentary presidents who, not being elected by popular vote, have a strong interest in party building, the institute of a popularly elected president encourages greater personalism, making it more difficult for parties to develop coherent programmes and identities (Mainwaring, 1993; Moser, 1998; White, Wyman & Kryshtanovskaya, 1995). Moreover, because – as we have already seen – presidential candidates need to seek a broader mandate than any given party, the popular election of the president often induces “[c]ampaign personalization [and] reduces the relevance of party platforms and party organization” (Samuels, 2002:480). At worst the popular election of the head of state “may serve as an incentive to demagoguery and populism” (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997:32; see also Harmel and Janda, 1982). In this sense, semi-presidentialism may even invigorate the danger of bonapartism, characterized by the instrumentalization of political parties with obvious populist traits (Bahro et al., 1998:217).

Second, the personalized character of a presidential race provides no safeguard and not buffer against political “outsiders”, with little or no political experience, seeking election (Elgie, 2001; Linz, 1994; Stepan and Suleiman, 1995). As Paksas’ victory in the 2002 presidential contests in Lithuania shows, these individuals may create parties at the last minute in order to run for the presidency, therefore, finding it very difficult to develop parties with strong linkages in society. Moreover, when successful, such presidents tend to ignore their own political parties, personalizing the partisan process.

21 For a critique of this hypothesized relationship, see Ishiyama and Kennedy (2001).
Thus, semi-presidential regimes are considered to contribute to “the creation of small and ephemeral parties, most often the personal vehicles of presidential candidates and little more” (Cadoux, 2007:96). This clearly contrasts with presidents in parliamentary systems, usually long-term career politicians and, in many cases, also former party leaders (either in power or in opposition) over many years. For them, political parties are clearly infused with value.

Third, while the incentive structure in parliamentary regimes encourages party discipline and, therefore, institutionalization of party organization, semi-presidential regimes have no such incentives for party loyalty (Epstein, 1967; Linz, 1994; Moser, 2001). In this sense, semi-presidentialism may contribute to factionalism, that is, to the institutionalization of division within parties rather than between parties (Azebedo and Nijzink, 2007), leading in the most acute case to the break-up of those political organizations.

A final criticism of semi-presidential regimes results from the “above party-politics” character of presidents, which in itself often appears to be a desideratum. Contrary to parliamentary regimes where, by definition, the support of a parliamentary party is a must for a successful candidate to become president, semi-presidentialism encourages the image of a president who is above and against political parties (Huskey, 2007; Linz, 1994; Meleshevich, 2007). Certainly, a non-party president which portrays him/herself as a representative of the whole nation\(^{22}\) will obviously hinder the process of party institutionalization, as individuals will “focus on forming personal attachments with presidential hopefuls, bypassing association with political parties” (Ishiyama, 2008:42; see also Meleshevich, 2007).\(^{23}\) In sum, it seems to be a commonly held notion among scholars that semi-presidentialism is the culprit for the lack of cohesive, disciplined, programmatic, socially rooted political parties in a country.

As can be seen in figure 5 below, which employs Lewis’ (2006) “index of party stabilization” (ips), political parties tend to be more institutionalized in parliamentary

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\(^{22}\) In parliamentary republics, even when elected with the support of a particular party or coalition, heads of state tend to adopt a neutral, rather than negative, attitude towards parties.

\(^{23}\) In this respect, the constitutional provision in Bulgaria, Romania or Lithuania that the president should not be a member of a party is in clear contradiction with a prerequisite for effective party development and institutionalization (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova, 1999:19).

\(^{24}\) The “ips” involves the progressive enhancement of the proportion of the total vote for political parties in a given election over time - by 20% for a party’s second appearance in parliament, 40% for the third, 60% for the fourth, 80% for the fifth, and so forth (Lewis, 2006:574-575). The logic is that, taking notice of both voter stability (in voters’ electoral preferences) and the age of a party organization, this index measures the two most important dimensions of party institutionalization, namely: stable roots in society and party organization (Casal Bértola, 2010).
systems than in semi-presidential ones. In fact, while among the nine systems with a higher degree of party institutionalization six are parliamentary, eight out of the nine systems where political parties are least institutionalized are semi-presidential: parliamentary Latvia constitutes the only exception. Hence, and as it follows from the third column in table A, the truth is that political parties tend to be more institutionalized, both in terms of rootedness and systemness, in parliamentary regimes (ips = 84.7) than in semi-presidential ones (ips = 75.6). In conclusion, it is possible to conclude that in post-communist Eastern Europe there is a positive relationship between type of regime and party institutionalization (r = 0.415).

Figure 5. Type of regime and party institutionalization in post-communist Eastern Europe (1990-2009)

Direct (Negative) Effect on the Stability of the Patterns of Inter-party Competition

As it results from Elgie’s definition, a critical departure of semi-presidentialism from parliamentarism is the presence of a “double electoral process” (Bartolini, 1984:227) which introduces a potential for instability in the patterns of inter-party competition certainly absent in the latter.

Contrary to parliamentary presidents, which tend to be elected either as the fruit of a compromise between the totality/majority of political parties or by a qualified majority which forcefully requires the support of the major parliamentary parties,

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25 Kosovo has been excluded from the analysis here, as it does not fulfill Lewis’ “two legislative elections” requirement (2006:571).

26 Parliamentary political parties tend to see this “almost compulsory” collaboration as ad hoc and strictly occasional.
presidential candidates in semi-presidential regimes face a different and broader “electoral” constituency (i.e. the electorate as a whole). Because they cannot afford to ignore any more or less significant segment of the population, broad coalitions which may include not only extremist political organizations but also any other political parties with a minimum electoral strength are likely to be formed. The main implication of this might be that, as a reward for their support in elections, “one or more of them can plausibly claim to represent the decisive electoral bloc in a close contest and may make demands accordingly” (Linz, 1990a:58), namely: participation in government, future electoral cooperation, etc. In this context, an element of instability in the structure of inter-party competition is introduced as the majority of leading presidential candidates will be “forced” to seek the cooperation of forces with which they would otherwise not be ready to collaborate, giving way to previously unseen cabinet coalitions or to the inclusion of a party excluded from government up to that time. This is clear in single-round elections, where electoral plurality might depend on even the small number of voters those “unusual partners” might be able to provide, but most especially in two-round elections, where political alliances come closer to the process of coalition formation in a parliament in search of a prime minister.  

Moreover, because “the [presidential] majority generated might not represent a politically more or less homogeneous electorate or a real coalition of parties” (Linz, 1994:21), these alliances of “presidential” parties tend to be very fragile and short-termed, since ideological and policy differences among heterogeneous member-parties of a loose (pre-)electoral presidential coalition are likely to broaden with time. Therefore, while in parliamentary regimes parties occupying different electoral niches normally compete against one another and the coalition of ideologically “close” parties generally takes place after the election and are binding; in semi-presidential regimes, the majoritarian character of the presidential elections not only may change the existing structure of inter-party competition, but tends also to impregnate the new patterns of interaction with a loose and temporary character.

A second way in which party system stability can be hampered by the mode of the election of the head of state derives from the higher status of the latter in semi-

27 Clear examples of how the mode of the election of the president modifies the existing structure of inter-party competition are Finland (1937), Bulgaria (2001), Niger (1999), Croatia (2000), Guinea-Bissau (2005), East Timor (2007) or, most recently, Slovenia (2008). In all these cases, the composition of the governmental coalition after parliamentary elections was determined by the patterns of inter-party collaboration during previous presidential elections, reducing the degree of party system institutionalization to a certain extent.
presidential regimes as compared to the position of the monarch or the president in parliamentary countries. In fact, even if the formal prerogatives of popular elected presidents are rarely much greater than those of parliamentary heads of state – notable exception are that of Russia, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states - they have often been able to use their greater “political legitimacy” prestige to stretch their influence in the making and breaking of governments and/or parliamentary coalitions. This is not to say, however, that in some parliamentary regimes the head of state cannot play an active role in the formation of governments and/or the interaction of political parties. However, because the president or the monarch is not independent of the assembly, he/she cannot claim to be “tribunes” above the partisan fray (Baylis, 2007:89). Thus, while in Italy, Germany or even Spain, the head of state will tend to follow the existing patterns of interaction among political parties, strengthening, rather than weakening, the stability of the system of competition as a whole; in semi-presidential regimes, the popular election of the head of state is likely to imbue presidents with a feeling that they, “although initially the choice of a small proportion of the electorate, […] represent a true and plebiscitary majority” (Linz, 1994:21) and that, consequently, they do not need to respect the “usual” process of coalition formation and partisan cooperation, introducing a potential for unpredictability and instability (see also Bartolini, 1984; and Duverger, 1980) which, on the other hand, will be higher the “fresher” the presidential mandate (Protsyk, 2005b:737; Shin-Goo, 2004). The logic is that the most recent electoral legitimacy of the president provides him/her with additional political leverage in the process of government formation, even in the case when, like in Bulgaria or in Ireland, his formal powers are severely restricted.

Finally, it is not only the sequence, but also the timing of presidential and parliamentary elections in semi-presidential regimes that enhances the likelihood of party system instability. Thus, as several scholars have found, presidential coattails will be higher the closer the two elections are held (Cox, 1997:209-219; Sedelius, 2006; Shugart and Carey, 1992:226-258).28

As we had the opportunity to see in section 1, there is a positive relationship between the type of regime and party system institutionalization ($r = 0.385$): on average, parliamentary systems ($iPSI = 1.2$) are more institutionalized than semi-presidential

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28 Romania, where both presidential and legislative elections have been traditionally held simultaneously since 1990, constitutes the most evident example.
ones (iPSI = -0.9). Moreover, and as it follows from table A, the latter tend to remain weakly institutionalized (iPSI ≤ 0), in clear contrast to the former (iPSI > 0).

Table 2. Regime-related outcomes for party system institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of regime</th>
<th>Direct effects on… Structure of competition</th>
<th>Indirect effects on… Electoral fragmentation (ENEP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0/+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semi-presidentialism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral timing</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-concurrent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral sequence</td>
<td>Presidential- Parliamentary</td>
<td>Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Plurality (run-off)</td>
<td>Majority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: “+” = positive effect; “-” = negative effect; “0” = non-effect; “n/a” = not available.

Table 2 summarizes the effects different regime types may have on the process of party system institutionalization in new democracies. In general, parliamentary regimes will be “institutionalization-friendly”, as they may have a positive impact or, at maximum, a non-effect on the process of systemic institutionalization, although never a negative one. In contrast, semi-presidentialism will always have a negative impact on the stabilization of the structure of inter-party competition, but in two instances: (1) when both types of elections are not held concurrently and the parliamentary contests precede to presidential ones; (2) last but not least, in those cases when both elections are held concurrently, presidential elections will have a reductive effect on the effective number of electoral parties, but only if a plurality rule is applied.

**Party System Institutionalization and the Type of Regime in Four Selected Post-communist Eastern European countries**

As it follows from the previous section, which analyses the impact that on party system institutionalization may have different regime types in post-communist Eastern Europe, semi-presidentialism - in clear contrast to parliamentarism - has, in general, a detrimental effect (either directly or indirectly) on the process of systemic institutionalization. However, and because correlation is not causation, in this section I complement the previous analyses with a procedure particularly suitable to make out “the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable […] and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005:296).

The idea is that, by breaking down the rather large process of systemic institutionalization into its constituent mechanisms, I can more easily identify the “chain of causation” leading from type of regime to party system institutionalization. With such aim in mind, and using “process-tracing”, I will proceed next to analyze the
specific relationship the abovementioned variables may have in four different, although very representative, cases: one is a paradigm of systemic institutionalization (Hungary), the other constitutes a clear instance of weak institutionalization (Poland), while the last two are examples of “type of regime” change, either from parliamentarism to semi-presidentialism (Slovakia) or vice versa (Moldova). Let’s examine then each of them in turn.

**Hungary**

In Hungary the head of state is elected by the Országgýlés (i.e. parliament) for a five-year term, with the possibility of just one re-election. Because any presidential candidature mandatorily needs the support of at least 50 parliamentary members, larger legislative parties tend to control the nomination process. Moreover, the nominee of the governing coalition at the time of the presidential selection is clearly favoured by the rules according to which the head of state is appointed: in case a qualified majority of two-thirds (of all MPs) is not obtained in the first two rounds, a third and last round is held where a simple majority - of all votes cast in a contest between the two-front runners - is enough.

On 3 August 1990, Árpád Göncz, a well-known writer and dissident who had been active during the 1956 revolution, became the first democratically elected president of Hungary as a fruit of a compromise between the two main political parties at the time, namely: MSZP and SZDSZ. Contrarily, the next three presidential elections departed from this consensual style, clearly responding to the existing patterns of inter-party competition (see Appendix).

Thus, both the 1995 and 2000 election of the president was the maximum expression of the confrontation between the government and the opposition. The main difference was that, while President Göncz was re-elected for another five year term in 1995 with the sole votes of MSZP-SZDSZ (O’Neil, 1997:215), in 2000 Ferecn Mádl, a professor of law not officially affiliated with any party and President Göncz’s rival in 1995, was elected on the third and final round with the “sole” support of both Fidesz and FPKG, as he had failed to win the supermajority required in the first two rounds of voting (Tavits, 2009:166).

The 2005 presidential election marked a slight turn in this trend as for the first time the governing coalition did not manage to nominate a consensus candidate. Still, as in the previous two elections, a candidate from the government was pitted against a candidate from the opposition. Katalin Szili, president of the National Assembly and
former vice-president of the Socialists was nominated by the MSZP. Because old President Mádl decided not to run for re-election, László Sólyom, a former president of the Constitutional Court and not an active politician, became the nominee of the opposition parties (Fidesz and MDF). In protest for the Socialist unilateral decision, the junior coalition party (SZDSZ) refused to participate in all rounds of the vote. In the event, Sólyom won the election in the third round by a three vote margin (185 to 187). Although the SZDSZ had not given up their position and, consequently, had not voted for Szili, this conflict between the governing parties did not threaten the coalition agreement (Ilonszki and Kurtán, 2006:1126), as the 2006 parliamentary elections clearly demonstrated (table B).

Hence, Hungarian presidential contests confirm my earlier expectations about indirect elections, namely, that they are decided either by compromise (e.g. Gönz’s) or by the pre-existing structure of partisan contestation (e.g. the rest), especially if – as it is the case – the sequence of elections respond to the parliamentary-presidential pattern (see Appendix).

On the other hand, while inexistent in terms of fractionalization, the effect of the indirect mode of election of the president on the process of party institutionalization has been quite positive. In this context, both the previously mentioned electoral sequence (i.e. parliamentary-presidential) and, mainly, the above-cited normative on the selection of the head of state has helped the party in public office to dominate the process of presidential nomination and appointment and, therefore, consolidate its “grid” on the party in central office (van Biezen, 2003), definitively institutionalizing its central position within their membership as well as the electorate as a whole.\\

Poland

The Polish president is directly chosen by the electorate for a five-year term, with the possibility of one re-election. The electoral system used is a majority runoff so, if no candidate receives at least 50 percent of the vote in the first round, a second round between the two front-runners takes place. The final winner is appointed head of state.

In Poland, the popular election of the president has had a very negative effect on the process of party system institutionalization since the very beginning, as it has

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29 Although some might see the emergence of István Csurka’s Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIEP) out of the MDF in June 1993 as a negative influence on the process of party institutionalization, the truth is that, when looking in depth at the way in which such split took place, it seems obvious that it was more influenced by personal and political differences within the MDF itself rather than by the abovementioned MDF-SZDSZ “presidential” coalition which, as we already know, gave the green light to the presidential appointment of the SZDSZ-nominee, Árpád Göncz (Deak, 2005:39).
fostered the creation of new political forces, while hindering at the same time the process of institutionalization of the already existing parties as well as the patterns of interaction previously established by them. Let’s examine then each of the presidential elections...and its effects.

The November 1990 presidential elections, won by Solidarity founder and Nobel laureate Lech Wałęsa in the second round, played a critical role in the definition and shaping of the structure of inter-party competition in Poland in two different ways: on the one hand, it reinforced the pattern of fierce opposition between Solidarity and anti-Solidarity forces already present in the 1989 (semi-free) parliamentary elections; on the other, it constituted the last straw in the decomposition of the “Solidarity” camp, started roughly eight months earlier when Wałęsa, then only the leader of the Trade Union, called for a “war at the top” between the several forces within the movement in order to facilitate its “orderly” disintegration and the formation of a “Western type” party system with two different ideological alternatives: left and right. Nonetheless, the effect of the presidential contest on the increase in the number of political parties should not be exaggerated. At the end of the day, it was the natural consequence of the process of disintegration of “Forum” type organizations, which also took place in other parts of the post-communist sphere (Migalski, 2005:55): for example, “Civic Forum” in Czechoslovakia, “Demos” in Slovenia, etc. However, what can be considered to be a direct consequence of the confrontation between Wałęsa and Mazowiecki in the first round was the fragmentation of the forces located in the right side of the political spectrum, mainly between Christian-democratic/conservative (heirs of those who supported Lech Wałęsa) and liberal-democratic political parties (heirs of those supporting Mazowiecki); whose interaction, since then and with few exceptions, have been characterized by a severe political enmity and lack of will to cooperate. On the contrary, and within the left camp, Bartoszcze’s (PSL) appalling electoral results caused his substitution for Waldemar Pawlak, a 32 years-old politician without “Solidarity” past, whose connections with the structures of the ancient regime peasant party [ZLD]

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30 Wałęsa’s election also had direct consequences for the stability of the structure of competition as a whole. Thus, considering itself to have been elected by a “true and plebiscitary” majority (Jasiewicz, 1997:134), Wałęsa claimed a direct mandate for his conception of a strong and active presidency with a right to directly intervene in the party system. The fall of Olszewski’s cabinet in June 1992 constitutes the best example (Jasiewicz, 1997:141; Tavits, 2009:97; Krok-Paszkowska, 2001:139).

31 The Democratic Union, which placed an essential role in the development of the Polish party system from 1991 to 2001, came into being in December 1990 from the fusion of the Citizens Movement Democratic Action (ROAD), the Forum of the Democratic Right (FPD) and other advocates of Mazowiecki’s candidature for president.
determined a turn of the party to the left and the beginning of its co-operation with the post-communist SLD (Migalski, 2005:56). Finally, the 1990 presidential elections had not other implications in terms of party institutionalization but to spark the formation and organization of new political forces. As “political parties were still at an early stage of development” (Sanford, 2002:179), the truth is that it was too early to see any negative effect on the process of party institutionalization, although the potential for the latter was already there: let’s think, for example, about the creation of the “X” Party by Tymiński immediately after his electoral “success” in the presidential race.

The 1995 and 2000 presidential elections also had important consequences for the process of party system institutionalization in Poland. Thus, Wałęsa´s defeat against Kwaśniewski in November 1995 due to the disunity of the forces within the political right prompted these parties to “temporally” unite in the so-called Solidarity electoral Action (AWS) in order to contest the parliamentary elections in 1997 (Szczerbiak, 1999), and to collaborate “ephemerally” with the liberal Freedom Union (UW) from October 1997 up to June 2000. In the same vein, the 2000 presidential elections, where Kwaśniewski (non-partisan) enjoyed the formal support of his former party (SLD) but also from the post-Solidarity Labour Union (UP), brought forward the formal collaboration between these two parties in both an electoral (Millard, 2002:362) and, later on, governmental alliance in 2001 (see appendix), putting to a certain extend an end to the so-called “post-communist” cleavage, giving path to a new pattern of inter-party competition: one based more on economic divisions that on cultural ones.

The two presidential elections here analysed also had an important impact in the “effective” number of parties. On the one hand, the unexpectedly result of former premier Olszewski (6.9 percent) constituted the solid basis for the creation of a new national-populist party, namely: the Reconstruction of Poland Movement – ROP (Migalski, 2005:61; 2007:219-220). Likewise, definitely thinking in his bid for re-election two years later, Wałęsa sponsored the creation of a new organization, the Non-Party Bloc for Support of Reforms in 1993. Although the new party failed to attract substantial popular support, it managed to reach the 5 percent threshold and enter parliament.32 On the other, the creation of three new parties in 2001 (PO, PiS, and LPR) were the immediate consequence of Krzaklewski´s crushing first-round defeat and

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32 Wałęsa’s defeat in 1995 also prompted BBWR to join forces with the National-Democratic Party and the National Party in the so-called Bloc for Poland, founded in April 1997 (Migalski, 2007:222).
Olechowski’s strong showing as a runner-up in November 2000 (Jasiewicz, 2007:91, 94).

Notwithstanding what has already been said, it was the process of party institutionalization which was more unambiguously influenced by the second and third Polish presidential elections. Thus, the arrival of the BBWR threatened the existence of other established post-Solidarities parties (e.g., PC or ZChN), whose societal roots were certainly undermined (Grzybowski and Mikuli, 1998:195). Moreover, and with the exception of the SLD, during the 1995 presidential race all major partisan organizations underwent a process of de-institutionalization of some sort.

For some (PSL, UW, UP), the process of candidate selection led to internal feuds among factions and/or personalities. Others (the Christian nationalist ZChN), posting no own candidate, feuded about whom they should endorse, shifting their alliances in the middle of the campaign, which led to a growing confusion among their own membership, candidates, and voters (Jasiewicz, 1997:162).

Even others were the object of internal splits, like the KPN, where part of its members regretted the lack of support for Wałęsa already from the first round (Migalski, 2007:222).

In the same vein, the already difficult process of organizational institutionalization of AWS, an ideologically heterogeneous formation of more than 30 different political groupings (Szczerbiak, 1999), was definitely brought down by Krzaklewski’s - the leader of Solidarity at the time and the mastermind behind the formation of AWS, third place and weak performance in October 2000. The latter clearly precipitated a major crisis of leadership and identity within the party, contributing towards its disintegration the year after (Szczerbiak, 2001:105). Definitively, Olszewski’s association with Krzaklewski’s failed candidacy also precipitated the disintegration of ROP and the integration of part of its members, headed by the same Olszewski, into the new hard-right, anti-EU, Catholic-nationalistic LPR (Millard, 2002). The divisions within AWS were also exploited by Lech Kaczyński, the increasingly popular Minister of Justice, who together with his twin brother Jarosław founded a new party (PiS). In the same vein, UW’s failure to nominate a candidate or straightforwardly support Olechowski’s bid led to internal political struggles which absolutely mined the unity of the party organization and finally culminated with the departure of Donald Tusk (and his supporters) to form a new political movement known
as the Civic Platform, together with Olechowski and Maciej Płażyński, former Speaker of the Sejm (Grzybowski and Mikuli, 1998:201; Migalski, 2005:63-64).

In contrast to the previous elections, the effect of the last presidential contest on the process of party institutionalization has been relatively weak, although forces like the Democratic Party (UW’s successor) or the SLD as well as the LPR have suffered, respectively, from the feebley performance and early withdrawal of their candidates in/from the presidential race. Conversely, and despite the almost concurrent character of the parliamentary and presidential elections, the significant increase in the “effective” number of presidential parties (from 2.9 in the year 2000 to 3.6 in 2005) boosted the “effective” number of electoral parties in more than one point (from 4.5 in 2001 to 5.9 in 2005). In Elgie’s own words,

[In Poland,] the problem with the majority run-off system was that it provided few incentives for parties to co-operate in support of a single presidential candidate. Instead, it encouraged small parties to stand candidates at the first ballot so as to increase their electoral visibility (2001:219)

In fact, as pointed earlier, in the event a party’s candidate has a good showing in the first ballot, it may have some clout in establishing the second round coalitions, giving him/her the right to demand some compensation for such support later on. This is what definitely happened in 2005 when both Self-Defence and LPR demanded from Jarosław Kaczyński, PiS´ leader, their share of governmental power as a compensation for their support to his twin brother (Lech) during the presidential race.⁵³ The inclusion of these two anti-establishment-parties (Sokół and Śmigrodzki, 2005:195) in the parliamentary coalition first,⁵⁴ and in the cabinet later on, definitely blew up the previous structure of competition, characterised by the political competition between two ideologically opposite camps (i.e., post-communist and post-solidarity) and the permanent exclusion of populist “anti-systemic” forces (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2006; Szczerbiak, 2007).⁵⁵

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⁵³ A similar offer was made by Self-Defence’s leader Andrzej Lepper to Donal Tusk (PO) between the first and second round of the presidential race. Contrary to PiS´ presidential candidate, the latter decided to refuse any kind of future collaboration between PO and Lepper’s party.

⁵⁴ PSL, which also supported Kaczyński (Lech) in the second round, also formed part of this “parliamentary” coalition supporting Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz´ minority government. This was the first time a post-communist party supported a right-wing cabinet.

⁵⁵ In September 2001, needed of a coalition partner in order to secure a governing majority in the Sejm, the SLD considered a coalition with the populist-agrarian party Self-Defence led by Andrzej Lepper, although it was finally rejected in favour of SLD’s old coalition partner instead: the agrarian PSL. Previously, other extreme political forces like KPN or ROP had suffered the same fate.
It follows from all that has been said that semi-presidentialism in Poland has “provided the potential for new axes of conflict without the mediating effect of long-established relationship among political parties” (Millard, 2000:59). Moreover, each of the presidential elections has not only brought a new political realignment in the political scene, but also foster party fragmentation and de-institutionalization. However, the low level of systemic institutionalization has not solely derived from the mode of election of the president but also from the way in which the sequence of presidential elections has structured partisan competition. In fact, the anticipation of presidential elections in 1990, 1995, and 2000 undermined the cooperation among the political forces of the right in 1991 and 1993, fomented their cooperation in 1997, while fostering its disintegration in 2001, respectively. Even in 2005, when parliamentary elections took place slightly ahead of presidential ones, the presidential campaign “contaminated” the former (Szczerbiak, 2007:204), undermining the pre-existing impetus to Kaczyński’s PiS’ co-operation with Tusk’s PO. In short, semi-presidentialism has had a negative (direct and indirect) effect on the process of party system institutionalization in Poland.

Slovakia and Moldova

Slovakia and Moldova constitute, without doubt, the most fascinating cases among the post-communist Eastern European sample as they represent the two unique instances of type of regime change. Thus, while the former changed parliamentarism for semi-presidentialism in 1999, the latter became parliamentarian only in 2000 (before it constitute a semi-presidential democracy). In this sense, both countries provide a “natural experiment” in order to examine whether change in the mode of election of the head of state has any influence in the level of party system institutionalization. Acting as a real “control” cases, they allow for a comparison between the effects of two different modes of presidential selection (i.e. direct and indirect) within one country. In this sense, they helps to keep constant other possible causal variables while, at the same time, enabling to discover whether the change in the type of regime itself precipitates change in the level of party system institutionalization. In other words, if the process of institutionalization respectively declined or increased after the reform of the regime, then this will tell us something about the pernicious effects of semi-presidentialism on party system institutionalization. If the contrary is true, then the initial hypotheses will be dismissed.
The first (indirect) presidential elections in Slovakia clearly responded to the already repeated demand for extraordinary consensus among the political parties, but not without an exhausting partisan struggle and a tough bargaining process between the first and the second ballot, when Michal Kováč, a member of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) at the time and former speaker of the last Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, managed to be elected with the support (see appendix) of the junior coalition partner (SNS) and the main opposition party (SDL´) (Goldman, 1999:62-63; Malová, 1994:416).

In a different vein, Slovakia´s 1998 presidential elections as well as Moldova´s since 2000 clearly fulfilled my second expectation: when not the fruit of a compromise, the selection of the head of state in parliamentary regimes will simply respond to the already existing structure of inter-party cooperation and collaboration, with no impact on the future patterns of partisan interaction. In fact, both the successful Moldovan presidential elections (2001 and 2005) as well as the disastrous contests in Moldova (2009) and Slovakia (1998) responded to the previous structure of competition characterised by the rather polarized confrontation between the parties of the “communist” (PCRM) and/or “authoritarian” (HDZS and SNS) government against the parties of the “democratic” opposition.

The PCRM, with a clear majority of 71 seats, easily managed to have his secretary-general, Vladimir Voronin, elected in April 2001 already during the first round. Four years later, the PCRM required the votes of the PPCD in order to have Voronin re-elected. Still, such “ad hoc” support of the latter did not have consequences in terms of the structure of competition for government, which continued to confront the governing communist against the rest. The May/June 2009 presidential elections also responded with the previous pattern, although they diverge in the sense that the ruling party alone (i.e. PCRM) could not have their candidate elected as it was just one vote short of the required majority), but it could still block (60 seats) any attempt of the

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36 Both the Slovak (1992) and Moldovan (2000) Constitutions required that, in order to be appointed head of state, a candidate needed to obtain a qualified majority of three-fifths of all parliamentary members (90 out of 150 and 61 out of 101, respectively). The main difference is while the former required the celebration of new parliamentary elections with new presidential nominees in case no candidate managed to be elected after two rounds, the latter gives the Moldovan President the possibility to dissolve parliament if such scenario takes place, but only after three rounds. In both cases, however, there is a potential chance for the post to remain vacant, producing an institutional deadlock and a dangerous political crisis (e.g. Slovakia in 1998 or Moldova in 2009).

37 Because the SDL´ made its support conditional on the president’s non-partisan position during his term in office, Kováč immediately suspended his party membership after the election.
opposition to get their candidate elected. President Voronin then dissolved the parliament and new legislative elections took place in July. Unfortunately, the result was again a deadlock parliament where the PRCM had 48 seats, enough to prevent the now governing “democratic” coalition to appoint a new president.

A very similar situation took place in Slovakia in 1998 when the ruling coalition at that time (HZDS, SNS and ZRS) could not have their candidate elected as it has only 82 votes (eight short of the majority required), but Meciar’s HZDS alone (61 seats) could block any attempt to get a candidate elected without their support (Malová and Učeň, 1999:503-504). As in Moldova (twice in 2009), the presidency remained vacant.

Although the constitutional gridlock in Slovakia ended with the 1998 legislative elections, which gave the “democratic” opposition (i.e. SDK, SMK, SDL´ and SOP) the necessary three-fifths majority needed to reform the constitution and provide for the popular election of the president (Malová and Lastic, 2001), a solution to the institutional and political crisis cannot be yet foreseen.

Contrary to what we have seen, the popular election of the Slovak president did introduce an element of stability in the structure of competition not even seen at the time when the President Kovác had no other choice but to intervene in the “normal” running of the party system (e.g. Moravcik’s cabinet). Still, it took some time for semi-presidentialism to alter the moderated degree of systemic stability achieved in 1998. In fact, the first direct presidential elections held in May 1999, roughly eight months after the legislative contest, still conformed to the previous dichotomous pattern of competition: Meciarists versus anti-Meciarists. The timing (quasi-concurrent) and sequence (parliamentary-presidential) of both legislative and presidential elections definitively contributed to it.

As soon as both the timing and sequence of the Slovak elections changed (see table B), presidential elections started to exert their “not-so-mysterious” influence (see section 2) on the process of systemic institutionalization. Thus, the rapprochement between nationalistic (SNS and HZDS´ splinter parties) and left-leaning forces (Smer) in 2006 would have been unthinkable without their joint support to Gašparovič’s

38 A similar scenario took place at the first indirect presidential election when, due to multiple splits and defections within the right-win parties, the PCRM could count on 50 up to 59 votes (Roper, 2008a:122).
39 New parliamentary elections will be held in autumn this year. Moreover, a referendum on the adoption of semi-presidentialism will be held shortly before (September, the 5th).
40 Like Havel in the Czech Republic during the 1997 government crisis and Tosovsky’s interim care-taker cabinet - which he promoted in the shadows, Kovác’s active interference totally respected the pre-existing government/opposition dichotomy and, therefore, did not cause any damage to the still precarious systemic stability.
candidature in 2004. In my opinion, it was this close electoral collaboration that favoured the formation of the government populist-nationalistic coalition between Smer, SNS and HZDS two years later. A similar relationship could be established, in principal, between SDKÚ, SaS, KDH and Most’s electoral support to Radicová candidature in the last 2009 presidential elections and the formation of the last Slovak cabinet a few weeks ago.

Figure 6. Type of regime and party system institutionalization in Slovakia and Moldova

In a similar vein, the Moldovan 1996 (direct) presidential elections also altered the existing structure of inter-party competition, pitting the opposition against the agrarian-bureaucratic PDAM, to a certain extent. In fact, President Lucinschi’s, who ran as an independent in the 1996 contest, decided to collaborate with his former party (PDAM) as a response to its support during the second round (EECR, 1997:19; Roper, 2008b:115), and even if the latter did not count anymore with an absolute majority at the time of Ciubuc’s appointment in January 1997. Moreover, the electoral confrontation between the President (Snegur), the Premier (Shangeli) and the Speaker of the Parliament (Lucinski) clearly exacerbated PDAM’s electoral decline from 43.2 in

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41 Even in the event of Meciar’s victory in the presidential contest, mainly thanks to the “tacit” support of the governing parties at the time, mainly SDKÚ and ANO (Rybář, 2005:336), the structure of inter-party competition would have been drastically altered as it would have facilitated the rapprochement between HZDS and SDKÚ and its collaboration in an eventual minority government, desired by the two parts (Malová and Rybář, 2008).
1994 to 3.6 in 1998. Last but not least, Snegur’s defeat at Lucinschi’s hands clearly diffculted the governmental collaboration between their respective two supportive political forces, that is, PMDP and PRDM/CDM (Roper, 2008b).

A quick look at figure 6 above, which quantitatively summarizes the level of systemic institutionalization for the period before and after the introduction of the direct/indirect election of the president, confirms the initial hypothesis, namely: party system institutionalization in parliamentary Slovakia (1993-2001) and Moldova (2001-2009) is/was much higher than during the semi-presidential period (i.e. Slovakia 2002-2009; and Moldova, 1994-2000).

Figures 7/8. Change of type of regime in Slovakia and Moldova: “indirect” effects

In the same vein, semi-presidentialism has also been indirectly detrimental for the process of party system institutionalization as it has increased the size of the party system while hindering, at the same time, the level of party institutionalization. As it follows from figure 7, which displays the ENEP in three different temporal points (at the first elections, at the first elections following regime change, at the last elections), electoral fragmentation increased during semi-presidentialism while reducing at the time parliamentarism was adopted. The same can be said when the ENEP average for the two regime type periods is calculated (see table 3). There it can be observed how in Slovakia the ENEP increased on two points with the introduction of semi-presidentialism, while decreasing in almost 1.5 points in Moldova after parliamentarism was adopted. Concrete examples of such negative relationship between the semi-presidentialism and party system institutionalization are the following: (1) the

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42 Similarly, the PCRM’s comeback in 1998 could, most probably, not have been possible without Voronin’s rather successful electoral performance in November 1996 (he came in third place with 10% of the votes).
presidential ambition of Schuster (SOP),
Rusko (ANO), Gašparovič (HZD) and, to a lesser extent, Fico (Smer), clearly contributed to the increasing number of political forces in the Slovak political spectrum from 1999; (2) similarly, the formation of two completely new parties at the beginning of the second half of the 1990s (PMDP and PRCM) was the result of, respectively, Lucinschi´s and Snegur´s bid for the presidency (Roper, 2008a:119-120).

Table 3. Type of regime, the “effective” number of electoral parties (ENEP) and party institutionalization (PI) in Slovakia and Moldova

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENEP (average)</td>
<td>PI (ips)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-2001</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2009</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations

But semi-presidentialism in these two countries has also been counterproductive for the institutionalization of individual political parties themselves. Figure 8 displays the scores of party stability (ips) in the two countries, both at the moment of regime change as well as in 2009. In both cases, the level of party institutionalization is clearly higher at the time of parliamentarism than under semi-presidentialism. Moreover, this difference can also be perceived when the two regime periods are taken into consideration as a whole (table 3), especially in Moldova. In this context, it is important to note that the number of party splits and mergers in Slovakia has been definitively higher from 1999 than in the previous period (see Rybár, 2004:35). In Moldova, Lucinschi and Shangeli´s electoral struggle for the presidency in 1996 did not but exacerbate the internal divisions within the once-dominant PDAM. Moreover, as stated in King (2000:162-163), the Snegur and Lucinschi´s confrontation deprived the later of the support of his former arch-nemesis Popular Front, which finally merged with Snegur´s PRCM to form the Democratic Convention of Moldova (DCM). All in all, and in comparison to what can be observed under parliamentarism, the adoption of a semi-presidential regime negatively affected both party system concentration and party institutionalization in both Slovakia and Moldova.

In summary, the two previous cases provide a unique proof that change in the type of regime corresponds to both qualitative and quantitative change in the process of institutionalization.
party system institutionalization, which heavily decreased at the time semi-presidentialism is in place.

**Conclusions**

In general, scholars have failed to predict the implications that the type of regime in general, and semi-presidentialism in particular, can have for the institutionalization of party systems in young democracies. One obvious reason for this has been the lack of a consensual definition of semi-presidentialism. Following the most recent scholarship and for the reasons explained above, I have chosen to adopt Elgie’s minimal definition of the concept which focusing solely on the mode of election of the head of state perfectly suits an analysis that avoids at all cost any reference to the constitutional powers of either the president or the prime minister.

After a brief review of the basic arguments in the type of regime debate, I argued that two mechanisms account for the weak party system institutionalization in semi-presidential regimes. The first refers to the mode of election of the president and its separate electoral legitimacy, which has a direct effect of the structure of inter-party competition. The logic is that while, on the one hand, the double electoral process, which requires from any presidential candidate a broader electoral base, many times across ideological lines, introduces the potential for instability (and unpredictability) in the patterns of interaction among the different political forces; on the other, the direct electoral mandate “empowers” the president to intervene in the party system, restructuring according to his personal interests, which do not always respond to the interest of the parties themselves. The second mechanism points to negative effect of semi-presidentialism on party system fragmentation and party institutionalization, affecting the level of institutionalization only indirectly. On the one hand, we expect party system size to vary with the number of presidential parties, and we know from other previous studies (Casal Bérmota, 2010 and forthcoming): as fragmentation rises, the structure of competition between parties is likely to face greater instability. On the other hand, the ability of popular presidential elections to encourage political outsiders as well as non-party candidates to stand for election, promote partisan factionalism and the personalization of politics should have a negative impact on the level of party institutionalization.

A detailed analysis of the mechanisms through which the type of regime affect party system institutionalization in four post-communist Eastern European countries reveals that while in Hungary, and Moldova since 2001, parliamentarism not only has
enhanced the stability in the patterns of inter-party competition, but also fostered party concentration and institutionalization; in Poland and Slovakia (since 2002) semi-presidentialism has definitely destroyed the pre-existing structure of competition after every presidential contest. Moreover, the popular election of the president in these two countries, as well as in Moldova up to 2000, has not only delayed the process of institutionalization (both at the societal and organizational level) of already existing political forces, but also increased both the actual and “effective” number of political parties, in itself boosted by the peculiar institutional arrangements adopted, namely: the combination of non-concurrent and majority run-off presidential elections.

In sum, and bearing in mind all what has been said, I am on safe ground when paraphrasing Moestrup to conclude that semi-presidentialism does not appear to be particularly well-suited for the institutionalization of party systems in young democracies (2004:228).

References


Eastern European Constitutional Review (EECR) (1997), v. 6, pp. 1-123


APPENDIX

Table A. Effects (direct and indirect) of the type of regime on the process of party system institutionalization in post-communist Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>iPSI</th>
<th>ENEP</th>
<th>PI (“ips”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parliamentary regimes (n = 8)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>86.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (2001-)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (-2001)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semi-presidential regimes (n =11)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (-2000)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (2002-)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (1992)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Direct presidential elections were held in Estonia in January 1992.
Table B. Parliamentary and presidential (s)elections/coalitions in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Moldova (1990-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary elections</th>
<th>Government parties</th>
<th>Presidential (s)election</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>“Presidential” coalition*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March/April 1990</td>
<td>MDF-FKGP-KNDP</td>
<td>May 1990</td>
<td>Árpád Göncz</td>
<td>MDF-SZDSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1994</td>
<td>MSDZ-SZDSZ</td>
<td>June 1995</td>
<td>Árpád Göncz</td>
<td>MSZP-SZDSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>MSZP-SZDSZ</td>
<td>August 2005</td>
<td>Laszlo Sólyom</td>
<td>Fidesz-MDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>MSZP-SZDSZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1991</td>
<td>WAK(ZChN)-PC-PL</td>
<td>November/December 1990</td>
<td>Lech Wałęsa</td>
<td>PC-ZChN-PL-KLD-etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>SLD-PSL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1997</td>
<td>AWS-UW</td>
<td>November 1995</td>
<td>Aleksander Kwaśniewski</td>
<td>SLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2001</td>
<td>SLD/UP-PSL</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
<td>Aleksander Kwaśniewski</td>
<td>SLD^46-UP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2007</td>
<td>PO-PSL</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>Bronisław Komorowski</td>
<td>PO^47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovakia (indirect election)^38</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1992</td>
<td>HZDS-SNS</td>
<td>February 1993</td>
<td>Michal Kováč</td>
<td>HZDS (-SNS-SDL')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September/October 1994</td>
<td>HZDS-SNS-ZRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1998</td>
<td>SDK-SDL'-SMK-SOP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovakia (direct election)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>SDKU-KDH-SMK-ANO</td>
<td>May 1999</td>
<td>Rudolf Schuster</td>
<td>SDK-SDL'-SMK-SOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Ivan Gašparovič</td>
<td>HZDS-LS (-SNS-Smer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>Smer-HZDS-SNS</td>
<td>March/April 2009</td>
<td>Ivan Gašparovič</td>
<td>HZD^49-Smer-SNS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The party of the president is underlined.

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^46 In 2000, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, although a former member of the SLD which supported him once again, was not the Alliance’s formal candidate.

^47 Although the SLD did not officially support Komorowski in the second round, some of its more important leaders (e.g. former secretary-general Wojciech Olejniczak) did.

^48 Similarly, the National Council of the Slovak Republic was considered the legal successor of the Slovak National Council within the Czechoslovak Federal Republic.

^49 In 2009, Ivan Gašparovič, although a former member of the HZD which supported him once again, was not a member of the party.
Table B. (continuation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary elections</th>
<th>Government parties</th>
<th>Presidential (s)election</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>“Presidential” coalition*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (direct election)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>PDAM</td>
<td>Nov./Dec. 1996</td>
<td>Petru Lucinschi</td>
<td>PDAM(^{50})-PSMUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1998</td>
<td>CDM-PMDP-PFD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Moldova (indirect election) |                    |                          |           |                            |
| April 2001                | PCRM               | April 2001               | Vladimir Voronin | PCRM                       |
| April 2005                | PRCM               | April 2005               | Vladimir Voronin | PCRM (PPCD-PSL-PDM)        |
| April 2009                | PCRM               | May/June 2009            | Vladimir Voronin (“acting”) | -                          |
| Sept. 2009               | PLDM-PL-PDM-PAMN   | Nov. 2009                | Mihai Ghimpu (acting) | -                          |

* The party of the president is underlined.

**Political parties:**
- **Hungary:** Fidesz = Federation of Young Democrats/Hungarian Civic Party; FKGP = Independent Party of Smallholders; KNPD = Christian Democratic People’s Party; MDP = Hungarian Democratic Forum; MSZDP = Hungarian Socialist Party; SZDSZ = Alliance of Free Democrats; Poland: AWS = Solidarity Electoral Action; KLD = Liberal Democratic Congress; LPR = League of Polish Families; PC = Centre Alliance; PChD = Party of Christian Democrats; PiS = Law and Justice; PL = Peasant Alliance; PO = Civic Platform; PPG = Polish Economic Programme; PSL = Polish Peasant Party; SDPL = Social Democracy of Poland; SLCh = Christian People’s Party; SDL = Democratic Left Alliance; SO = Self-Defense; UD = Democratic Union; UP = Union of Labour; UW = Freedom Union; WAK = Catholic Electoral Action; Slovakia: ADSR = Alliance of Democrats of the Slovak Republic; ANO = Alliance of the New Citizen; APR = Alternative of Political Realism; HZDS = Movement for a Democratic Slovakia; KDH = Christian Democratic Movement; Most = Bridge; NDK = National Democratic Party; SaS = Freedom and Solidarity; SDL = Party of the Democratic Left; SDK = Slovak Democratic Coalition; SDKU = Slovak Democratic and Christian Union; Smer = Direction/Social Democracy; SMK = Hungarian Coalition; SNS = Slovak National Party; SOP = Party of Civic Understanding; ZRS = Association of Workers of Slovakia; Moldova: CDM = Democratic Convention of Moldova; PAMN = Our Moldova Alliance; PCRM = Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova; PDAM = Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova; PFD = Party of Democratic Forces; PL = Liberal Party; PLDM = Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova; PDM (PMDP) = Democratic Party of Moldova (For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova); PSMUE = Socialist Party and “Unitate-Edinstvo” Movement Bloc.

\(^{50}\) Although a former member, the Moldovan Democratic Agrarian Party did not support Lucinski during the first round, but Andrei Shangeli, Moldova’s prime minister at the time.