Russia and the West Must Find New Ways of Reconciliation, Panelists Say

The present crisis is as serious as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, said Professor Richard Sakwa, keynote speaker at the Russia in Global Politics - Driving Values and Interests conference. Co-hosted by CEU’s Center for EU Enlargement Studies (CENS) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Budapest, the April 20 event was part of CEU’s Frontiers of Democracy series.

“While the Yalta Conference of 1945 acknowledged the power of Soviet Russia, and accepted a geopolitical and ideological pluralism, Western politics have not regarded Russia as an equal after 1989,” said Sakwa, who is professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent and associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs.  The West has lived in a “fool’s paradise” in the last 25 years, but it is not the resurfacing differences of the two sides that pose the biggest threat to stability, but the lack of ways of reconciliation and communication, he said.


Richard Sakwa, professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent and associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, discusses post-Soviet politics at CEU conference. Photo: CEU/Peter Rakossy

“It is a widespread belief here that the West simply does not like Russia be it communist or democratic, and that Western foreign policy is very hypocritical,” said Andrei Kortunov, director General of the Russian Council on Foreign Relations and president of the New Eurasia Foundation. Differences cannot be reconciled with “one stroke,” he said, and called for establishing “the rules of the game” and regular consultations between the two sides to ensure predictability.

According to Derek Averre, senior lecturer at the University of Birmingham, one of the most important questions of the Ukrainian crisis is whether the EU can become a foreign policy and security actor. “There is no strategic doctrine, no strategic debate in the EU,” Averre said, adding that “President Putin still leaves the door open between the pro-European and less cooperative narratives.”

“Russia and Germany have much in common. We can make big mistakes, and I think Russia made a big mistake last year in Ukraine,” said Karsten Voigt, who is a member of the Board of the German Council on Foreign Relations and the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Not acting like a big power, and making decisions with the presence of smaller nations and acknowledging their interests, has been fundamental in German foreign policy since World War II, according to Voigt. Therefore, Germany will not negotiate on the future of Ukraine with Russia “above the heads of Ukrainians.”

Marcin Kaczmarski, assistant professor of the University of Warsaw explored Russia’s relations with China. He found the fact Russia is extensively cooperating with China a sign of a peaceful power transition. China is very careful to demonstrate its “benign motives”, and respects Russia’s own identity as a big power, he added.

The second panel focused on the values and interests driving Russia’s policies in post-Soviet space. Donnacha O Beachain, director of research at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, approached Russia from the perspective of its neighbors in his speech, focusing on the four post-soviet unrecognized states, Transistria, Abkhazia, NKR (Nogorno-Karabakh), and South Ossetia. These states have very similar origins and conditions, are heterogeneous, are deviant and also very durable, he observed.  Recognized states fared worse in Freedom House’s ranking in 2014 than unrecognized states, proving, as he said, that “it’s not all about great power politics” in the region.

Ruslan Grinberg, director of the Institute of Economics at the Russian Academy of Sciences, described the love/hate relationship that developed between Russian and the European Union after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The mutual “love” of the late 1980s and early 1990s turned into hatred by now. “It is difficult to be hopeful,” he noted. He referred to the Eurasian Economic Union as “another great illusion,” with conflicting expectations on both the Russian and post-Soviet states’ side. The conflict with Ukraine caused “major damage” in Russia’s external relations, he noted. “Our noble task now is to convince politicians to restore normal life in Ukraine.”


CEU’s Center for EU Enlargement Studies and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Budapest co-hosted Russia in Global Politics - Driving Values and Interests conference on April 20. Photo: CEU/Peter Rakossy

The third panel of the conference discussed the impact of Western sanction on Russian economy and society. The “influence of sanctions is overrated,” said Natalia Zubarevich, professor at Moscow State University. The recent crisis started in 2013, when the economic development based on resource rent stopped. The destabilization of regional budgets, the drop in investment, and declining personal incomes have all contributed to the current economic crisis, she said.

Yulia Baskakova, project manager at Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM) and senior research fellow at the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, discussed how the sanctions affect everyday life in Russia, based on weekly surveys. There’s no legitimate opposition in Russia, and the majority of the population perceives the crisis as a tragic set of circumstances. Ukraine serves as morale boosting negative example, and Putin’s popularity is soaring, Baskakova concluded.

Andrei Ryabov, senior research fellow at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, discussed why the economic sanctions have no impact on Russian domestic politics. The sanctions have neither initiated a discourse in the political elite, nor a public demand for democratic reforms. Russian society is experiencing a crisis of identity, and the more external pressure, the more society consolidates current power, he noted.

“The objective is reconciliation not isolation,” even though security structures cannot be built on unfinished states, Peter Balazs, director of CENS, said in his closing remarks. The necessary building blocks are consolidated, stabilized, and recognized states. The model role of the West as instigator of integration and modernization has been questioned. We have to wait and see what way Russia will choose.