Disappearing Bitches: Canine Affect and Postcolonial Bioethics

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ABSTRACT: This article engages with the animal bodies that haunt the transnational pet-cloning industry: the “used-up” surrogate-mother dogs said to be returned to dog-farms and slaughtered for human consumption in South Korea. I explore how “Western” criticisms that reduce the problem to Korea’s dog-eating culture and lack of bioethics—interlocking with nationalist and cultural relativist responses among Koreans—reiterate postcolonial relations within transnational bioethics, further pushing these animals into the shadows. I trace shame and disgust (as affective remainders of canine bodies) as a way to critically examine the bioethicalization of animal welfare as an operation of the biopolitical order of things among human and nonhuman bodies in the field of transnational biotechnology, in an effort to remind us of the canine others within us.

In 2009, BioArts International—a biotech company based in California—announced that it had “completed delivery of healthy cloned dogs to all five of its clients” from its commercial dog-cloning project Best Friends Again.1 This project was performed in partnership with Sooam Biotech Research Foundation in South Korea, led by Dr. Woo Suk Hwang—a celebrity scientist disgraced for data fabrication and bioethics violations in his human stem cell research. He had also led the research team at Seoul National University that delivered the

first dog clone in the world just before his dismissal from the university.

However, the key point of the BioArts announcement was the company’s decision to discontinue cloning services. CEO Lou Hawthorne attributed this decision primarily to “unethical, black-market competition” from RNL Bio, another South Korean company that had joined the pet-cloning industry. To reduce care costs, Hawthorne claimed, RNL would return the retired surrogate-mother dogs to dog farms, where dogs are raised for human consumption. Because “the idea of dog eating is quite shocking to Westerners,” Hawthorne argued that such practice would not constitute an acceptable bioethical standard for animal welfare. He further remarked that the reason South Korea was first to clone dogs had “far less to do with scientific acumen, and far more to do with the availability of dogs as ova donors and embryo recipients,” supplied by dog farms.

In this context, Hawthorne’s criticism raises an ambivalence that guides my investigation into the transnational dog-cloning industry, while the treatment of animals has become a contentious site where the power relations of sex, race, species, and nation are articulated and re-articulated in the process of transnationalizing bioethics. On the one hand, Hawthorne’s sobering perspective helps us to depart from the prevailing frame of cloning as asexual genetic reproduction that often revolves around the question, “Will the clone of your beloved pet be the same as the original?” Instead, what matters are the lives left out of the frame, especially the female reproductive bodies that are essential to current cloning technology (especially for the canine, due to its unique reproductive physiology). Then, the problem emerges as a biopolitical issue: how the pet-cloning industry reproduces valuable lives (“the originals” and their “clones”) by rendering other lives—such as surrogate-mother dogs, egg-donor dogs, and “defective” or “extra” clones—disposable.

On the other hand, Hawthorne’s criticism, which evokes both the postcolonial repertoire of exotic food and the Western suspicion about pseudo-science, also arrested me with a baffling sense of shame at the disgust “Westerners” are said to feel toward my people, who “eat dogs”—a debilitating kind of affect I do not endorse but nevertheless is mine. This affect attests to how Hawthorne’s speech im-

2. Ibid. In this announcement, Hawthorne lists six primary reasons for the cessation of the service: the tiny market, unethical black market competition, a weak IP, unscalable bioethics, unpredictable results, and the distraction factor (such as exhausting media attention).

3. Ibid.
mediately dis/locates various bodies—Westerners, Koreans, and the surrogate-mother dogs themselves (or their meat)—within a normative order of who/what constitutes the proper subject of bioethics (in relation to what constitutes the proper subject of meat). From this perspective, this article asks how Western-centric “animal welfare” discourse reiterates postcolonial power relations in a time of transnational biotechnology. In this, this article also aims to question the persistent perception of rapidly growing Asian biotechnology as “maverick” science, alongside the global expansion of bioethics as a biopolitical institution invested in the Western-centric norms.4

From that starting point, this article traces the used-up surrogate dogs haunting the transnational dog-cloning industry. In a sense, such tracing constitutes a practice of Jacques Derrida’s ethics of living with the specters of others.5 However, it does not evoke the specters of the original dogs but rather those of the erased maternal bodies that return in the form of dog-meat and its corporeal forces—leaving affective impressions of shame and disgust upon those who speak/write about them. Following these affective remainders, this article examines how the commerce between Western-centric animal welfare discourses and defensive nationalism has shaped the biopolitical erasure of animals within the dog-meat/biotech loop. In this sense, these canine forces mark the postcolonial and posthuman condition of the transnational bioethics—as well as that of my own writing.

**Opaqueness as Theoretical Passages**

However, I have not yet found concrete evidence that dogs used as surrogates for pet cloning have actually been slaughtered for meat. Hawthorne was the first to raise this issue, but his accusation pointed to a future possibility rather than to what had already happened: “For every dog cloned by RNL in the future, it is likely that a dozen


or more will be slaughtered for food as a direct result.”6 Other than the existence of the dog-meat industry in Korea, his argument was based on the analysis that RNL’s plan to drop its pricing by 70 percent would be impossible without compromising animal welfare. His conjecture is certainly plausible (and there might be evidence that he did not publicly disclose), but it nonetheless remains unproven.

I asked RNL for an interview, but received no response. The company was the first to commercially clone a companion dog, and media have since reported its success with dogs for special purposes, its plans to build a new dog-cloning center, and its acquisition of patent licenses; however, it is unclear to what extent RNL has actually engaged in cloning pet dogs. As of early 2013, the company was no longer (at least publicly) cloning dogs at all, and later that year it was reorganized as K-StemCell, a company specializing in stem cell therapy—leaving in the dark the fate of former surrogate-mother dogs.

Although the initial accusation by Hawthorne targeted RNL, such criticism has put BioArts’s former partner Sooam—currently a major provider of dog-cloning services—on the table as well. When I asked about this during my visit to Sooam’s facility, Dr. Hwang responded that the dogs are borrowed from “special breeders” and returned after they recover from the cloning process.7 Another scientist carefully suggested that these breeders might be those who run dog farms for meat, but added, “I’d like to believe that the surrogates are treated separately.” In a later conversation, Sooam’s vice president, Dr. Taeyoung Shin, explained that clients could elect to adopt the surrogate-mother dogs with the clones (although this had not happened yet). Otherwise, surrogates purchased by Sooam are raised in the company’s separate facility afterward, and borrowed surrogates are returned to the breeder under the agreement that they be used only for breeding.8

A former customer of Sooam who runs the website My Friend Again—which provides promotional information about Sooam’s dog-cloning services—responded to the allegations:9

8. Taeyoung Shin, e-mail message to author, September 15, 2013.
9. My Friend Again, http://myfriendagain.com. The website previously offered a promotional discount code for cell-banking company Viagen, and later showed an ad for a similar company, perPETuate. The profits from these advertisements are donated to animal charities, according to the Facebook page linked to the website. However, in April of 2015 the website introduced a cell-banking service linked directly to Sooam.
Sooam allowed me complete access to their entire process. . . . All animals under their care are treated humanely. The surrogates are never used more than twice for cloning purposes. They are tended to 24 hours a day around the clock. Once they have finished with the cloning process the surrogates are then sent to live the remainder of their lives at another location. . . . Sooam knows that there will be questions about what happens to surrogates after cloning. As Sooam begins to offer dog cloning services to the world they intend to keep their doors wide open.\textsuperscript{10}

Such testimony appeases the concerns to some degree, as it suggests that Sooam is invested in the welfare of the surrogate-mother dogs. However, it still offers no details about “another location.”

John Woestendiek, author of \textit{Dog, Inc.}, which offers a thorough investigation into the dog-cloning industry, reported that at least in the past “some of the surrogate dogs used in Korea have gone to ‘farms’—meaning they were then raised for their meat.”\textsuperscript{11} However, in an e-mail conversation with me, he wrote, “As the industry has progressed, there has been a better realization of the whole public relations side and the concerns of dog lovers and animal welfare types,” and so “it’s quite possible that . . . the dogs no longer come from meat farms.”\textsuperscript{12} However, he added, “Sooam doesn’t specify what those places are, but insists they are not meat farms. Short of following some egg donor/surrogate dogs who are leaving the facility, and seeing where they end up, I’m not sure how to get the answer.”\textsuperscript{13}

Amid this fragmentary and sometimes conflicting information, actual events remain opaque. Considering that Sooam alone has cloned more than 500 puppies (as of September 2014), that a surrogate-mother dog is used only twice for that purpose, and that the pregnancy rate is 10–50 percent (and if we assume that a pregnant dog delivers two clones on average), then there might be from 250 to

\textsuperscript{10} “Dog Cloning Story,” \textit{My Friend Again}, http://myfriendagain.com/dog_cloning_story.html. This page does not show the date of update. However, the author of this website was also concerned, but was not certain about Sooam’s treatment of surrogates, when we spoke about it in April of 2013. So, this page seems to have been updated between our conversation and my access to this page on September 28, 2013.


\textsuperscript{12} Woestendiek, e-mail message to author, August 31, 2013.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
1250 former surrogate-mother dogs from this one company alone. Moreover, besides Sooam there have been several other dog-cloning projects in South Korea—sometimes on a massive scale—which adds up to much larger numbers of former surrogate-mother dogs.

Where did they all go? I find Woestendiek’s analysis of the situation persuasive, and it conforms to my own findings. However, instead of taking this opaqueness as something to clear up—by “following” these dogs as hinted by Woestendiek, or by pushing Sooam and other institutions to reveal the locations—I approach this uncertainty as a part of the problem to be examined, and as a passage to more situated language and sensibilities with which to account for this opaque site of research.

The opaqueness surrounding these surrogate-mother dogs intimates not simply a lack of clear information but an interlacing of epistemological effacements with the biopolitical production of killable bodies. In this sense, the examination of disappearing dogs in the pet-cloning industry invites conversation between Cary Wolfe’s criticisms of speciesism as a paradigm of modern biopolitics and feminist criticisms on the invisibilization of maternal bodies in scientific and technological representations. As such, the word bitches

14. The pregnancy rate (numbers of dogs pregnant over numbers of surrogate-mother dogs) differs depending on factors such as the freshness of the somatic cell of the donor dogs. On my visit to Sooam on March 30, 2013, the research manager told me that the rate is between 10 percent and 50 percent, which was used for my calculation. However, the Sooam website also describes that in 2005 the pregnancy rate had been below 2 percent, but in the five years since then the average pregnancy rate rose to 30 percent (http://en.sooam.com/dogcn/sub03.html). Considering the much lower pregnancy rate at the beginning, the number of surrogate mothers so far might be even higher.


in this article’s title marks both the sexualized and animalized production of abject bodies.

However, the effacement of these animals is compounded by a geopolitical and historical context in which the bioethical discourse on surrogate-mother dogs is reduced to Korea’s “dog eating” culture. As Maneesha Deckha points out, the treatment of animals, especially in food practices, has often been a point of racial and cultural differentiation; hence, more consideration of the racialized and postcolonial dimension is called for in posthumanist and feminist animal studies.\(^\text{18}\) In this context, instead of jumping into the bioethical debate concerning lab animals in South Korea, this article takes a detour through the dialectical exchanges between the colonialist stigmatization of dog eating (in the language of animal welfare) and the nationalist defense of traditional food culture in Korea—in which the interchanges between farm-raised dogs and surrogate-mother dogs have been pushed further into an invisible zone.

In conversation with biopolitics, postcolonial criticisms, and feminist animal studies, this article engages with the opaqueness of the research site as a space for examining embodied entwinement with spectral others. This project therefore also inherits feminist ethics that attend to entanglement with other bodies—forcefully demonstrated in Donna Haraway’s trans-species affiliation with the Oncomouse\(^\text{TM}\) and in Rosi Braidotti’s posthuman assemblages.\(^\text{19}\) It also draws upon what Mel Chen calls “the style of disappearance” as she pays homage to the toads that used to hop around the yard of her childhood home—but which are now vanishing after contamination by a lethal fungus grown in labs where amphibians were studied.\(^\text{20}\) Chen’s retrospective accounts for the empathetic affinities with these animals in the web of toxicities do not, however, overwrite one’s non-innocent involvement in their effacement—offering a useful reference for engaging with the complexity of the entanglements with these dogs. Emerging from these theoretical positions, this article presents not a comprehensive exposition of what happened to the former surrogate


dogs, but a cartography of the ontological, representational, and affective landscape upon which these dogs have disappeared.

“White People Saving Yellow Dogs from Yellow People”: The Second Time as Farce

Although investigations into pet cloning in Korea have not proven that surrogate-mother dogs are consumed, some critics (such as Woestendiek) have persuasively demonstrated that South Korea’s competence in dog cloning owes much to the farms that raise dogs as meat—an easy source for the large number of female dogs used as egg-donors and embryo-recipients.\(^{21}\) This suggests not only that dog cloning as a way of reproducing memorable pets is systemically imbricated with the institutional reproduction and killing of animals for human consumption, but also that such imbrication is contingent on specific techno-cultural and social contexts.

As such, Lou Hawthorne’s efforts to establish bioethical protocols in the emerging industry are noteworthy. Before the partnership with Sooam, he initiated companion animal projects within the United States—in particular the Missyplicity project (the first companion dog-cloning project), as well as animal cloning project undertaken by Genetic Savings & Clone (a predecessor of BioArts). Both of these projects developed codes of bioethics that were quite impressive in terms of the animal rights discourse.\(^{22}\) Further, BioArts tried to ensure “a certain standard of animal welfare” within South Korea by contractually requiring Sooam to never return surrogates to the farm that produced them.\(^{23}\) Hawthorne also offered gestures of cultural awareness and relativism in his accusation against RNL—for example, after saying “obviously the idea of eating dogs is quite shocking to Westerners,” he added, “just as U.S. consumption of 34 million cows per year is shocking to most East Indians.”\(^{24}\)

In this regard, I am not arguing that white people should not criticize non-Western cultures, nor am I raising cultural relativism to defend the treatment of dogs in Korea. The problem here is the dis-

24. Ibid.
cursive and affective structure through which the surrogate-mother dogs have become the bioethical concern in a transnational context. Some Western critics have reduced the problems surrounding surrogate dogs to the unethical use of dogs by a “shocking” dog-meat industry in South Korea.²⁵ Such a reduction appears in Hawthorne’s statement, and virtually all Western news reports about Korean pet-dog cloning cite a line or two on the dog-meat industry from John Woestendiek’s book. Furthermore, the possibility of surrogate-mother dogs being returned to dog farms has become a signifier for Korea’s lack of bioethics and its larger illegitimacy in the global market. When dog eating becomes an immediate deal-breaker, the language of bioethics has exhausted the logic of cultural relativism and instead invokes the affect of disgust at the eating of dog meat—an affect that has often been integral to the production of sexual, racial, and other forms of “Other(s).” In this way, the discourse imposes a Western notion of animal welfare as the norm for bioethics, and thereby posits Western subjects as the ethical agents who guard bioethics in the context of chaotic transnationalization of biotechnology—belying their involvement in the social and historical structure in which animals are used for scientific and medical research.

This discourse on surrogate-mother dogs also echoes something familiar. What Gayatri Spivak formulated as “white men saving brown women from brown men” now oddly repeats in another form: white people saving yellow dogs from yellow people.²⁶ Spivak’s phrase recapitulates how the voice of Indian women was doubly appropriated in the debates around Britain’s abolition of widow sacrifice in colonial India, first by the masculine-imperialist discourse of saving (in which the women are reduced to objects of protection from their own kind) and then by the patriarchal Indian nativist discourse that “the women wanted to die” (ironically locating a woman’s agency in burning herself on her husband’s pyre, based on dubious interpretations of the Rig-Veda and Dharmasastra).²⁷ Through analyzing these “dialectically interlocking” discourses, Spivak discusses how the British and nativist positions legitimize each other as they assimilate Indian

²⁵. I use the term “Western” (and the “West”) not to reconfirm the fixed binary between West and East but as a strategic misnomer to refer to criticisms that claim a “Western” perspective or that construct their perspectives in opposition to those of “Eastern,” “Asian,” and “Korean.”


²⁷. Ibid., p. 297.
women’s voices. Spivak offers this analysis as an extension of her critical examination of Western intellectuals (such as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze) who profess “letting the other(s) speak for himself”—making their intellectual labor of representing third-world subjects transparent within the international division of labor.28

My reformulation of Spivak’s phrase points to both the symmetry and the asymmetry between the original and the revised formula, transposing the trajectory of the critique. On the one hand, the revised phrase draws upon Spivak’s insight that the colonialist discourse of saving appropriates the interest of Indian women by opposing it against Indian men—only to consolidate the status of British colonialism. Similarly, “white people saving yellow dogs from yellow people” points to how the Western discourse of animal welfare speaks for the interest of yellow dogs by opposing it against yellow people, consolidating Western normativity into the bioethical debate. By showing this, the phrase also depicts how the original formula repeats in variations, re-enacting postcolonial relations even in a cutting-edge technological field such as cloning.

On the other hand, as a parody, my phrase plays on the folly of such reformulation, by intimating the critical difference between women in colonial India and dogs in contemporary South Korea. As the title “Can the Subaltern Speak?” suggests, Spivak’s formula raises the question of the Indian woman as the subject of representation (or the impossibility thereof), who can speak both as and for herself. However, with the dog—a species already defined partly by its inability to speak and hence by its incompetence as a sovereign subject (especially within the prevalent Western philosophical tradition)—this parody does not refer to the communicative ability or legal agency of the animal, even though there is a certain political value in rethinking the question of the animal through the concepts of linguistic and legal subjectivity (as hinted in titles like “Can the Subaltern Bark?” or “Can Animals Sue?”).29 Rather, this asymmetry


intimates something about animal bodies that resists total inclusion into the original formula (which revolves around an ethics based on a certain kind of subject that can “speak” for oneself and about oneself), and even contaminates the sentence with its doggy-ness. Here, the dog is not a mute/d subject but instead a carnal affect that brings both Koreans and Westerners into the circuits of disgust and shame in the event of transnationalizing bioethics. In other words, these circuits of affects are the traces that the surrogate-mother dogs (or their meat) have left within and between those who represent them, suggesting another passage through which to follow these dogs.

Within this discursive-affective matrix, criticism that represents the treatment of surrogate-mother dogs as a transparent index of the lack of bioethics in South Korea, even if well-intended, is nonetheless problematic—it reinscribes the colonial power relations within bioethical discourses, and thereby obscures the complicity of modern bioethics in the abjection of animals in scientific practice. This matrix also accounts for the circumstances in which “concern” regarding these female dogs takes the form of either silence or hyperbolic disavowal in a (post)colonial sensibility in South Korea, responding to the patronizing and humiliating inscrption of “bioethics” upon Korean science.

The “Dog Meat Issue”: Animal Rights, Nationalism, and Cultural Relativism

The “dog meat” issue has always been at the center of animal advocacy discourse in South Korea, to the point that “most of the currently active animal advocacy organizations in Korea began with the fight against dog-meat.” However, how dog eating has become the animal issue—among many other problems that are (or are not) shared with Western culture—is entwined in the historical context of Western stigmatization and the reactions to it among Koreans. As such, this article addresses the debate surrounding dog eating in Korea not because it is the most important bioethical issue in the dog-cloning industry, but to show how the primacy of (or obsession with) this issue has shaped the geopolitical climate in which the bioethics of dog cloning and other biotechnologies is discussed and practiced.

Boudewijn Walraven, a scholar in Korean studies citing An Chon (a rather heterodoxical historian of Korea), examines the history of

the dog-eating debate in Korea. The first strike against eating dog meat in South Korea was led by Austrian-born first lady Francesca Donner Lee in the late 1940s. The effort was unpopular and brought only superficial changes, such as switching the popular name for dog stew gaejang-guk (dog soybean-paste soup) to the less descriptive boshintang (invigorating stew). While disapproval of dog meat receded during the Korean War, a second major international criticism of Korean dog consumption began in the 1980s, when a South Korean government established by coup d’état was anxious to offer a good image to the world through the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. In response to a boycott by international animal welfare advocates of Korean commodities and the Seoul Olympics, in 1983 and 1984 the government took to regulating “repugnant foods,” banning the sale of dog meat at market and prohibiting restaurants from serving boshintang in large cities (where foreigners were more likely to visit). However, these bans were not strictly enforced, and vendors avoided regulations by again changing the name of dog stew, this time from boshintang to youngyangtang (nourishing soup) or gyejoltang (seasonal soup).

Both international and domestic criticism of dog eating resurfaced before the 2002 World Cup (which Korea co-hosted with Japan), pressing the Korean government to ban the consumption of dogs. French actress Brigitte Bardot wrote to Korean president Young-sam Kim that Korea’s dog eating was nothing but a savage practice; she also made notoriously racist and arguably unreasonable claims during...
ing a phone interview with a Korean radio talk show (which she ended by abruptly hanging up).\textsuperscript{35} Bardot has become the symbol of the movement opposing dog meat in Korea, aggravating already-existing perceptions that “dog meat = traditional culture” and “anti-dog meat = imperialism,” resulting from the top-down policy on dog meat imposed by the military government in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{36}

Between international pressure and the Korean government’s superficial responses, dog eating and the related industry have remained in a grey area—dogs are officially included in the livestock category, and dog meat constitutes a livestock product under the Livestock Industry Act, but dogs are \textit{excluded} from livestock by the Livestock Product Sanitary Control Act.\textsuperscript{37} As such, raising, slaughtering, processing, and distributing dog meat is not subject to legal regulation, but it is also not quite illegal.\textsuperscript{38} Accordingly, as the hygiene and environmental issues continue to resurface, attempts have been made to formally legalize dog meat and put the industry under regulation—such as the Livestock Product Processing Act reform bill, submitted by Hong-shin Kim and twenty other lawmakers in 1999.\textsuperscript{39} The amendment did not pass, however, as the assembly recognized that it would result in both international and domestic resistance.\textsuperscript{40} In 2008, the Seoul city government announced another attempted amendment, which was criticized by animal advocates, and no further action was taken.\textsuperscript{41}


\textit{Chuksanmul uisaenggwanniribeop} [Livestock Product Sanitary Control Act], Statutes of Republic of Korea, http://www.law.go.kr/lsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=1&nwYn=1&query=축산물위생관리법&x=0&y=0#liBgcolor0.

38. KARA, \textit{Report on the dog consumption industry} (above, n. 33).


40. The amendment was resubmitted in 2001 (when the World Cup was just around the corner), and again did not pass. J. Jo, “A study on the animal rights discourse” (above, n.30), p. 125.

These efforts to legitimize dog consumption have often (if not always) gone hand-in-hand with a nationalist response against Western pressure and the government’s compliance toward it. Hong-shin Kim wrote in a letter to Bardot that the Livestock Product Processing Act should be revised to include dogs because “our people’s health has priority over foreigners’ gaze.”\(^{42}\) At the same time, a group of progressive celebrities and organizations announced a “declaration of non-intervention” demanding that foreign countries respect Korea’s traditional food culture, in response to the increasing international pressure around the 2002 World Cup.\(^{43}\)

In these nationalist discourses, eating dog becomes the issue of a “traditional food culture” (or “local food culture”) that should continue and be protected from foreign intervention. Yong-geun An, a professor of food and nutrition and the only scholar specializing in dog meat (also known as “Dr. Dog Meat”), has excavated historical records ranging from a fourth-century tomb painting to French missionaries’ writings in the nineteenth century in an effort to prove that eating dog is Korea’s traditional food culture.\(^{44}\) He argues that disavowing dog eating because of foreign criticism is “toadyism and neglect of sovereignty.” Koreans, he claims, should be proud of and actively develop and spread dog-meat cuisine throughout the world.\(^{45}\)

While assertive nationalism regarding dog meat is a minority position among Koreans, the perception that dog eating is Korean “culture” is a prevailing perspective on the issue, often couched in the language of cultural relativism. This explains why a majority of Koreans are against banning dog consumption even though most Koreans do not actually eat dog meat.\(^{46}\) One survey found that 72 percent


45. Ibid., pp. 3–4. In this book, Y. An not only introduces recipes for various dog meat dishes, but also urges readers to develop recipes to fit foreigners’ tastes and habits—to globalize Korean dog-meat cuisine. His position is rather eccentric even among Koreans who support dog eating, but he nonetheless hyperbolically illustrates the thoughts and sensibilities underlying popular discourses in Korea.

46. The actual number of Koreans who eat dogs is difficult to measure. According to a poll by SBS Radio (one of the major broadcast companies in Korea) in 2007, 25.5 percent of Koreans eat dogs. Quoted in Hui-kyung Cho, “Gaesigyong hapbeobhwai ham-
of respondents (all women, in this particular case) answered, “I do not eat boshingtang, but think it is a matter of individual choice,” and another survey showed that 69 percent of those who do not eat dog meat “do not agree with some foreign animal advocacy organizations’ accusations that boshintang culture is savage.” As these research results (and the rhetoric of the questionnaires) show, a cultural relativist approach to dog meat entails a nationalist sentimentality responding to postcolonial conditions.

This widespread cultural relativism on the dog eating issue has created rough terrain for Korean animal advocacy. For example, KARA (Korean Animal Rights Advocates) has attempted to challenge the cultural relativist defense on dog eating via two distinct registers. On one hand, KARA argues that dog eating is not a Korean tradition, but rather was influenced by China during the Chosun Dynasty when Sinocentrism prevailed. KARA also points out that the modern “farming” of dogs is itself in conflict with Korean tradition, which has never treated animals as mere commodities. On the other hand, it argues that cultural relativism is a method only for understanding different cultures, and that ethical universalism should be applied to make a normative judgment, especially concerning the suffering of “the weak, such as life [sic] and women”; it also offers the example of female genital mutilation in Africa and the Middle East (with pictures of women in veils, as the icon of the violence against these women).

KARA makes a valid point when it notes the limit of cultural relativism for engaging with ethical and political problems. However, in assuming that cultural relativism is a purely epistemological project for understanding local culture separate from ethical and political judgment, KARA’s proposition paradoxically depoliticizes both “tradi-

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47. I. Jo, Research on policies (above n. 41), p. 23. The first poll was undertaken in 1997, and the second in 2000.
49. Ibid., pp. 113, 117–118.
tional culture” and “universal ethics.” Through such separation, the proposition erases the political aspects of how dog eating has become a traditional culture—in historical and anthropological discourses as well as in pop-cultural representations—in the postcolonial encounter between Korea and the West. Furthermore, KARA’s perspective on a universal ethics effaces its resonance with the normativization of postcolonial power relations.

Cultural relativism has limits—not because it offers only epistemological tools distinct from ethical criteria (as KARA suggests), but because it assumes that cultures are segmented into separate areas, diluting the political and historical construction of a “culture” through encounters with others. In this regard, cultural relativism offers a weak criticism at best against imperialist discourses, as Lila Abu-Lughod’s critique on the discourse of “Muslim women” suggests.50 Calling attention to obsession with the cultural iconicity of veiled Muslim women in the post-9/11 United States, Abu-Lughod criticizes how the rhetoric of “saving Muslim women” is used to overwrite and legitimate the messy historical and political background of the “War on Terror.”51 In particular, she notes a resonance with British colonialisit discourses, where colonial interventions into widow sacrifice, child marriage, and other practices concerning women in South Asia were used to justify colonial rule.52 She also wonders whether Western feminists are so readily mobilized to save Muslim women because they feel sorry for them (“to whom they can feel smugly superior”), which only reflects how they project their own pursuit of liberation onto these women without considering the actual meaning of veiling to them.53 However, Abu-Lughod does not relapse into the cultural relativism that reproduces “the imaginative geography of West versus East, us versus Muslims, cultures in which First Ladies give speeches versus others where women shuffle around silently in burqas.”54 Instead, she points out that we already live within global interconnections in which “Islamic movements themselves have arisen in a world shaped by the intense engagements of Western powers in Middle Eastern lives.”55

51. Ibid., p. 783.
52. Ibid., p. 784.
53. Ibid., p. 787.
54. Ibid., p. 784.
55. Ibid., p. 789.
Resonating with the transnational connectedness noted by Abu-Lughod, Walraven analyses dog eating as a cultural product of “the confrontation of local preferences with global pressure” from the intensification of East-West contact in the contemporary world.56 In this vein, Walraven considers the difference between the character of kimchi (which has earned an official symbolic status of Korean-ness) and of dog meat (which is still controversial, and is not important in the typical Korean diet), attending to how each food has acquired its symbolic attachment to Korea’s national identity in the context of multicultural controversy. In this sense, South Koreans’ defensiveness regarding dog meat is not a natural expression of cultural identity; rather, it involves complex logical, affective, and political dynamics, forming Korean-ness in the course of the transnational debate.

Likewise, both Western-centric criticism on the status of surrogate-mother dogs (in the rhetoric of “animal welfare”) and nationalist/cultural relativist responses to that criticism (in the form of silence) extend the dog eating debates that have developed within the post-colonial relations between Korea and the “West.”57 In the search for an alternative, Claire Jean Kim’s question about whether “slaying the beast” as an enactment of sovereignty for both imperialist and nationalist regimes offers a sustainable civility—a question that arises as she examines the interlacing of racialization and animalization in debates around the live-animal market in San Francisco’s Chinatown.58

Like the multiculturalist advocates of the live-animal market in San Francisco, Korean dog-meat advocates also claim cultural sovereignty over “slaying” based on a speciesist division between what is edible and what is not: “We do not eat pet-dogs. We eat only dogs that are raised for meat.” However, recurring media reports that stray and abandoned dogs are turned into soup—including “pet” breeds such as poodles and Maltese—intimate the frailty of any division between meat and pet, while “pet” culture as a Western transplant

is only ambiguously and contingently distinguished from the more traditional culture of raising dogs as guards.\(^5\)

However, the stories of poodle soup challenge not only the nationalist claim regarding the pet/meat division, but also bioethical discourses in which the treatment of surrogate-mother dogs is reduced to the dog-meat debate. While this kind of discourse certainly relies on its own pet/meat dichotomy, it belies the compliance with other kinds of slaying. Most obviously, it erases putting to death of shelter animals—a systemic mass-killing of the surplus bodies of pet culture—and neutralizes slaying of lab animals—a slaying that undergirds the cultural and speciesist sovereignty of the Western/human subject within the transnational bioethics.\(^6\)

"Someone Else Farting through Your Mouth": Affect as Postcolonial Ventriloquy

Cultural studies often approach certain foods as a confirmation of identity, binding the eater to where he belongs. In such an approach, the focus is on how one affirms her origin (sometimes even despite stigmatization), which underpins a politics of identity that calls for shedding shame and being proud of one’s own culture—as rather hyperbolically shown in “Dr. Dog Meat’s” push to globalize dog-meat cuisines. However, I take a different line of thought, in conversation with affect theories, and in particular with Elspeth Probyn, who explores eating as an event in which “we lose ourselves in a wild morphing of the animate and the inanimate.”\(^6\) From this approach, eating is a locus of transformation through visceral engagement with

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59. In South Korea, pet culture—as known by Westerners—took off only after the 1990s, and has since become popular. As of 2014, there are about five million pet dogs in South Korea, whose population is about fifty million. However, more-traditional forms of raising dogs— raised outside as guard animals, for example—also involved companionship with humans. For a detailed discussion of the history and culture of pet ownership in South Korea, see Anthony L. Podberscek, “Good to Pet and Eat: The Keeping and Consuming of Dogs and Cats in South Korea,” Journal of Social Issues 65:3 (2009): 615–632, esp. pp. 624–625.

60. According to the USDS, 891,161 animals (including 67,772 dogs) were used for biomedical research in 2013 in the United States. However, this number does not include rats, mice, and other animals that are not covered by the Animal Welfare Act but constitute the majority of laboratory animals. USDA, “Annual Report Animal Usage by Fiscal Year,” November 29, 2014, https://speakingofresearch.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/usda-animal-research-use-2011-13.pdf.

Here, my point is not to criticize the speciesism of using animals as biomedical research subjects, but to note how the institutionalization of laboratory animals is a backdrop to criticism on the treatment of the surrogate-mother dogs.

others, rather than consolidation of a fixed identity. Reflecting on her experience with anorexia, Probyn explores disgust and shame as the hidden face of body pride, as well as other identity politics based on body and sexuality—including projects of affirming the body, be it gay, black, disabled, fat, or old. The problem is that such a willful claim for “pride” does not necessarily nullify the affects of shame and disgust: one’s face could blush, eyes close, or stomach become upset, even though one tries to resist. Probyn uses these untamable affects of shame and disgust as measures of the body’s own reflective capacities to reach out, spill over, hide, and run away, revisiting affect theorist Silvan Tompkins’s discussion that disgust has “evolved to protect the human being from coming too close,” while shame is in part “generated by the recognition of having been too close.”

Affects of shame and disgust as bodily measures of reflexive distance/intimacy take a biopolitical significance given their roles in the production of the social and cultural abject. Julia Kristeva, for example, attends to corporeal responses of spasm, retching, repugnance, and shame as an index of one’s encounter with “the abject.” The abject, according to Kristeva, is what has been ejected by “I” in the process of entering into the symbolic order as an independent subject. However, as a reminder of perishable corporeality that has never entirely disappeared, the abject does not cease to challenge “I” and instead draws him “towards the place where meaning collapses.” Kristeva’s discussion demonstrates the primacy of affect (of disgust) over logos in considering the Other that wanders around outside the realm of representation. In this regard, the investigation into affects of shame and disgust is in line with Rey Chow’s observation: “the inextricable linkages between the sensorial, the aesthetic, and the social” provide insight into “the politics of knowledge production in the face of large periodic markers” such as Enlightenment, modernity, colonialism, and postcoloniality.

In conversation with theories that examine affect as an analytic tool for measuring intimacy with and distance from other bodies as well as the politics of knowledge production, let me regurgitate


64. Ibid.

the phrase “white people saving yellow dogs from yellow people.” To play with Allen Weiss’s note on a strange food combination that “the shock of categorical incongruity was an overture to all future discourse,” we can think of how the dog—in the categorically incongruent form of meat of pet—choreographs the affective dynamics between those who have been too close to dogs (by eating dog meat) and those who are disgusted by it. These affective circuits do not always align neatly with the primary division between Korean and Western critics, East and West, but are also complicated by differences within Korean society: the meat is associated with oriental maleness (as an aphrodisiac), blue-collar ethics, and rural culture. Therefore, these circuits are deeply charged with sexual and class affects as well.

In this context, what if we suspend the Sisyphean exercise of throwing away shame and disgust in order to recover the self-same subject (by being proud of the Korean custom of eating dogs), and instead take it as an instance of sensing the work of “the other” within the self, arising in the encounter with other bodies? That is, what if we consider the sense of shame to be an instance of canine affect upon and within our bodies—giving up the fantasy of the unitary subject and recognizing encounters with other bodies as we articulate bioethics? Through affect as an analytic tool for examining bodily assemblages, I suggest re-envisioning Spivak’s postcolonial critique of the politics of representation. Here, the problem is less that one speaks about or for the (mute/d) dogs, appropriating their voice. Rather, one speaks of and through one’s body, which is affected by canine corporeality—being shamed, disgusted, or affected in other ways—that in turn rearranges the distance and order among speaking and eating bodies.

On one end of this affective circuit, there are bodies that are disgusted by dog meat—either expressly so, or by feeling embarrassed at being disgusted or even adventurous with something disgusting (like those trying “exotic foods”). Criticizing these bodies for being disgusted will not chase the disgust away if it is only displaced by a sense of guilt over being disgusted. The intractability of disgust points to what Tomkins has already diagnosed: disgust is a mark of the oppressor, which “whenever an individual, a class, or a nation

67. Probyn also questions the linear narrative that by being proud of her own body she makes those who categorize her as disgusting feel ashamed of themselves; they would feel guilty at best, but disgust, blame, and resentment would be merely pushed under the “surface of a sanitized veneer of acceptance” (ibid., p. 130).
wishes to maintain a hierarchical relationship, it will have to resort to.”68 As such, one can problematize this affect of disgust by utilizing disgusted bodies as a touchstone for the normative order of things in the biopolitical production of im/proper bodies and relations.

From this perspective, I reflect on how “animal welfare” as bioethics is intermingled with the normativizing force of disgust, caused by the “shock of categorical incongruity”—echoing in variations of the phrase “to pet and eat” in Western discourses on dog meat in Korea and other Asian countries.69 For example, Harold Herzog and Lauren Golden argue that people with higher visceral disgust sensitivity—associated with “elevated levels of ethnocentrism, prejudice, and right-wing authoritarianism”—are “more likely to be upset by animal suffering and thus more apt to become involved in the animal protection movement.” This claim is dangerously moralistic but it nonetheless offers a useful insight, although at odds with the authors’ arguments.70 Their argument intimates that the “animal protection movement” might be contingent on disgust sensitivity and its sterilizing force—moralizing the biopolitical order of things, including the hierarchies of race, class, and species as well as the categories of farm/pet/lab animals. Of course, the affect of disgust cannot explain away the attack on dog eating by animal rights advocates. However, the fetishization of dog meat as the animal question in Korea and the moralization of this categorization point to how the ethical and political arguments about animal welfare intermingle with the normativizing force of carnal affects against other races, classes, and species in a transnational context.

On the other end of this affective circuit are those shamed for being disgusting (for being too close to dog meat), or ashamed of being shamed by their own culture. This sense of shame is not the direct opposite of disgust, to borrow Tomkins, because what the oppressor’s disgust develops in the oppressed is often “contempt for


69. Podberscek’s article “Good to Pet and Eat” is only one among many that examine Korea’s dog eating culture primarily through what is most shocking about it (at least to Westerners)—the idea of “eating” what we “pet,” the violation of categorization. He explains such a distinction of animals (even among the same species) through Michael Fox’s concept of compartmentalization. Podberscek, “Good to Pet and Eat” (above, n. 58), p. 628.

themselves.”

However, it is possible, if not common, for this self-contempt to be replaced by emphatic shame—but only when the oppressed has internalized the democratic ideal. It is through this oblique space (in relation to the diagonal opposites between disgust and self-contempt) that I approach Koreans’ responses to the dog-meat debate in terms of shame. And it is with this obliqueness of shame, combined with its self-erasing and reclusive propensity, that I return to postcolonial criticism of the difficulty (or even impossibility) of representation.

In this regard, Probyn offers further stinky food for thought in her discussion of a short story. The protagonist discovers the joys of Swedish tinned herrings that smell of shit and keep fermenting inside the stomach. What’s more, it leads to uncontrollable burping: “Well, this was like someone else farting through your mouth.”

In the controversy around dog eating, a non/human postcolonial ventriloquism might also be “like someone else farting through your mouth.” Even though one is too ashamed to speak about one’s shame, and even though the dog (or meat) does not speak (or bark), the canine body ferments inside and generates uncanny burps—reminding us that we have already been contaminated. This kind of ventriloquism deconstructs the dominant concept of the bi-ethical subject as primarily logocentric—as dictating the biopolitical order of various bodies—while it implode the division between Homo loquens (“talking man”) and mute animal as well as between the speaking subject and the eating body. From this perspective, a non-anthropocentric bioethics in the transnational context neither universalizes “animal welfare” nor adds geographical specificities to it. Rather, it begins with looking at the other within—at the human as animal.

Spivak ends “Can the Subaltern Speak?” with the perplexing case of Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, who hanged herself after not being able to carry out a political assassination (in the interest of Indian independence) during menstruation—a gesture that both conforms to and reverses the native patriarchal norm. Through Bhuvaneswari’s death, which performs the impossibility of Indian women’s speech, Spivak offers a postcolonial feminist response to Derrida’s ethics of “rendering delirious that interior voice that is the voice of the other in us.”

74. Ibid., p. 308.
mother dogs is also my response to this call for rendering the voice of the specters within—or rather, the affective remainders of the canine within. As I trace the remainders of these animals, such canine affect as a form of non/human postcoloniality influences not only my own writing (and silence) but also the production of bioethical discourses in an age of transnational biotechnology. In this sense, these surrogate-mother dogs are less an object of research than they are my Ariadne.

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In his examination of the limits of humanist ethics, Wolfe draws upon a passage from Spivak:

> The great doctrines of the ethical universal, in terms of which liberalism thought out its ethical programmes, played history false, because the identity was disengaged in terms of who was and who was not human. That’s why all these projects, the justification of slavery, as well as the justification of Christianization, seemed to be alright; because, after all, these people had not graduated into humanhood, as it were.75

In this vein, while “it is understandable that traditionally marginalized groups and people would be loath to surrender the idea of full humanist subjectivity,” Wolfe suggests that “it is not as if we have a choice about the coming of post-humanism; it is already upon us, most unmistakably in the sciences, technology, and medicine.”76 If the ethical universal is false because it recognizes humanness only in those who conform to the liberal notion of the subject, another manner of deconstructing the doublet of “liberal subject—ethical universalism” would be to recognize the non-human as well as the quasi-human that permeates the liberal subject.

This article makes a critical intervention into the liberal bioethical discourses from a postcolonial and canine-affective perspective, engaging with the debates surrounding “used-up” surrogate-mother dogs that haunt the transnational dog cloning industry. In exploring how these bitches have disappeared through interlocking Western-centric animal welfare discourses and nationalist reactions, the affects of shame and disgust emerge as the trace of these dogs left


upon us as they disappear. As such, these canine affects play two roles: while they point to uneven relations among Koreans, Westerners, and dogs themselves, they also refigure the bioethical subject as affective bodies permeable to others—therefore contingent on normative arrangements among human and nonhuman bodies. In this sense, the bioethical debate surrounding former surrogate-mother dogs is a biopolitical event whose impact far exceeds the task of applying cultural relativism or incorporating geopolitical specificities. Instead, it concerns the rearticulation of the liberalist biopolitical order of things within the transnational bioethics—the political implications of which are imminent as various forms of bodies are increasingly incorporated into the circuits of biotechnology.